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Overview
The global financial system continues to be buoyed 
by strong investor risk appetite. International 
financial markets have been remarkably stable for 
much of the past six months, with historically low 
volatility and ‘search for yield’ behaviour evident 
in many asset classes amid highly expansionary 
monetary policy. This environment has supported 
economic growth and an ongoing improvement 
in most banking systems. Nonetheless, a significant 
reassessment of risk could lead to a sharp repricing 
of assets, particularly if markets are less liquid than 
anticipated. Potential triggers for such a reappraisal 
include revised expectations for monetary policy 
in advanced economies. Up to this point, however, 
market prices have reacted remarkably little to 
credit and geopolitical events that might have been 
expected to affect investor risk appetite. 
Risks surrounding European banks and sovereigns 
have lessened but not disappeared, given the slow 
growth environment. European banks have made 
some progress with balance sheet repair in the 
lead-up to the release of the European Asset Quality 
Review, though if the results are unexpectedly 
negative, it could impede these banks’ ability to raise 
additional capital. Conditions in many emerging 
markets have stabilised since early 2014. However, 
credit and property prices have grown strongly in 
some emerging economies, including China, which 
may have made these economies more sensitive to 
adverse shocks.
Financial system stability in Australia is being 
underpinned by the continued strong financial 
performance of the banking system. Australian 
banks have improved their resilience to future shocks 
by increasing capital ratios, and their profitability 
remains robust, aided by further declines in bad and 
doubtful debt charges. They are also benefiting from 
improved wholesale funding conditions globally. 
This in turn has put downward pressure on deposit 
pricing and fostered an environment of stronger 
price competition in lending. Non-banks are also 
benefiting from the lower funding costs, with 
issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities 
by a wider range of entities (including mortgage 
originators) picking up and associated spreads 
narrowing. 
The low interest rate environment and, more recently, 
strong price competition among lenders have 
translated into a strong pick-up in growth in lending 
for investor housing – noticeably more so than for 
owner-occupier housing or businesses. Recent 
housing price growth seems to have encouraged 
further investor activity. As a result, the composition 
of housing and mortgage markets is becoming 
unbalanced, with new lending to investors being 
out of proportion to rental housing’s share of the 
housing stock. Both construction and lending 
activity are increasingly concentrated in Sydney and 
Melbourne, where prices have also risen the most. 
In the first instance, the risks associated with this 
lending behaviour are likely to be macroeconomic 
in nature rather than direct risks to the stability of 
financial institutions. Property investors in Australia 
have historically been at least as creditworthy as 
owner-occupiers, and mortgage lending standards 
remain firmer than in the years leading up to the 
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financial crisis. Even so, a broader risk remains that 
additional speculative demand can amplify the 
property price cycle and increase the potential 
for prices to fall later, with associated effects on 
household wealth and spending. These dynamics 
can affect households more widely than just those 
that are currently taking out loans: the households 
most affected by the declines in wealth need not 
necessarily be those that contributed to heightened 
activity. Furthermore, the direct risks to financial 
institutions would increase if these high rates of 
lending growth persist, or increase further. In this 
environment, recent measures announced by 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) should promote stronger risk management 
practices by lenders. The Bank is discussing with 
APRA, and other members of the Council of Financial 
Regulators, additional steps that might be taken to 
reinforce sound lending practices, particularly for 
lending to investors. 
The dynamics in the housing market are also 
relevant in considering risks in commercial property 
markets. This area of Australian business activity 
has strengthened over the past couple of years, 
unlike most other parts of the business sector. Amid 
the global search for yield, Australian commercial 
property has attracted strong investor demand, 
both domestic and foreign. This has boosted prices 
and widened the disparity between movements in 
prices and rents for both CBD office and industrial 
property. Any significant reversal of this demand 
could expose the market to a sharp repricing. At this 
stage, however, the broader risks to financial stability 
from this source remain modest, because banks’ 
commercial property exposures are a smaller share 
of banks’ total assets than prior to the crisis.
Conditions in other parts of the financial sector are 
generally favourable. General insurers’ profitability 
remains strong overall, with the industry currently 
benefiting from a benign claims environment. 
Buoyant conditions in the housing market have also 
contributed to stronger profits for lenders mortgage 
insurers. The part of the financial sector considered 
‘shadow banking’ continues to decline as a share 
of financial system assets. It currently poses little 
systemic risk in Australia because of its small size 
and limited credit and funding links to the regular 
banking system.
As G20 Chair for 2014, Australian authorities – 
including the Reserve Bank – have continued to 
work with the Financial Stability Board towards 
substantially completing key aspects of four core 
areas of reform: building resilient financial institutions 
through the Basel III reforms; addressing the ‘too 
big to fail’ problem associated with systemically 
important financial institutions; responding to 
shadow banking risks; and making derivatives 
markets safer. Progress appears largely on track to 
achieve, by the November G20 Leaders’ Summit, 
the key deliverables set out at the start of the year. 
However, achieving these high-level agreements 
would still leave some challenging areas of detail to 
be worked out, particularly on aspects of ‘too big to 
fail’ and derivatives markets reform.
The Financial System Inquiry released its 
wide-ranging Interim Report in July. While the 
report offered a largely favourable assessment 
of the current financial regulatory framework, 
it did highlight some areas for improvement, 
including potential measures to promote increased 
coordination among regulators. The Bank made a 
second submission to the Inquiry, covering areas 
related to financial stability and the responsibilities 
of the Reserve Bank, particularly for the payments 
system.  R
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As advanced economy banking systems continue 
to recover, potential risks arising from broader 
financial market developments are increasingly in 
focus. International markets had, until recently, been 
remarkably stable, with historically low volatility 
and ‘search for yield’ behaviour prevalent. Financial 
asset prices reacted remarkably little to credit and 
geopolitical events that might have been expected 
to affect investor risk appetite. This has been 
somewhat unwound in recent weeks. 
The low interest rate environment has continued to 
support a modest recovery in the global economy 
and an ongoing improvement in most banking 
systems. In the past six months, there has been a 
broad-based decline in non-performing loan (NPL) 
ratios for banks in the major advanced economies, 
with the ratio at euro area banks declining for the 
first time since the financial crisis. This has supported 
bank profits in most advanced economies, while for 
banks operating in emerging markets, continuing 
strong credit growth has underpinned profits. 
Search for yield behaviour has also supported an 
improvement in banks’ capital positions.  
Nonetheless, a sudden reassessment of risk could 
lead to a sharp repricing of assets, particularly if 
markets are less liquid than anticipated. In Europe, a 
decline in investor risk appetite could worsen banks’ 
standalone funding profiles and increase recourse to 
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) funding program. 
Similarly, while conditions in many emerging 
markets have largely stabilised since early 2014, past 
rapid growth in credit and property prices in some 
countries – including China – have made these 
economies more sensitive to adverse shocks. 
Graph 1.1
Global Financial markets
Global financial conditions remain buoyant overall 
and measures of market volatility remain low despite 
recent increases in some markets (Graph 1.1). Yields 
on a range of financial assets drifted down during 
much of the past six months. Part of the decline 
occurred because investors expected policy rates in 
major economies to remain low for a more extended 
period, but investors have also been willing to 
accept less compensation for taking on risk. Global 
equity prices in several advanced economies have 
risen strongly, and advanced economy long-term 
sovereign bond yields fell over the past year and 
remain at very low levels by historical standards 
(Graph 1.2). Spreads between the yields on higher- 
and lower-risk financial assets have generally 
narrowed (Graph 1.3).
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In an environment of elevated risk appetite, strong 
issuance of lower-rated debt was met with robust 
investor demand. Stressed-economy European 
sovereigns, such as Cyprus and Portugal, successfully 
returned to funding markets at favourable pricing 
relative to the recent past, often with oversubscribed 
issuance. Favourable financial conditions also 
extended to stressed-economy banks. For example, 
beginning in March, Greek banks returned to 
capital markets, with oversubscribed bond issues at 
comparably low yield spreads. 
Graph 1.4
Graph 1.3
Similarly, issuance of both investment grade and 
non-investment grade corporate bonds have 
remained robust across the advanced economies 
(Graph  1.4). In the United States, issuance of 
‘covenant-lite’ loans has increased, pointing to some 
relaxation in underwriting standards, and there has 
been rising investor demand for complex products 
such as collateralised loan obligations. Large global 
banks have also managed to issue hybrid securities 
(also known as contingent convertible bonds, or 
CoCos) that count towards the new Basel III capital 
requirements, although the risks associated with 
these relatively new securities are uncertain and 
difficult to price (see ‘Box A: Recent Trends in the 
Issuance of Basel III Compliant Contingent Capital 
Instruments’).
To an extent, increased risk taking is an intended 
consequence of accommodative monetary 
policy. Financial conditions have supported an 
improvement in economic activity in a number of 
advanced economies over the past year. Ongoing 
policy support has also allayed investor concerns 
about the probability of damaging tail-risk events. 
Important in this regard has been the ECB’s 
long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), which 
were recently extended as ‘targeted’ LTROs.
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Nonetheless, the buoyant financial environment also 
raises concerns that investors may not be adequately 
taking risks into account. A key consideration for 
policymakers is the extent to which the favourable 
pricing on riskier assets is justified by fundamental 
developments, and how resilient markets would 
be to changing circumstances. The concern is that 
a sudden reassessment of risk could lead to a sharp 
and damaging repricing of assets that undermines 
economic activity and aggravates debt burdens 
among sovereigns, households and businesses 
in a number of countries. Potential triggers for 
an adjustment in asset prices include revised 
expectations for monetary policy in advanced 
economies, adverse credit events, or geopolitical 
events, such as the tensions in Ukraine or Iraq. That 
said, recent events of this nature have so far had a 
limited impact on broader markets.
On interest rate risk, the extent of monetary 
accommodation in the global economy is 
unprecedented (Graph 1.5), so it is unclear how 
the process of an eventual unwinding of current 
monetary settings will play out. Events in mid 2013, 
when financial markets reacted strongly to changed 
expectations for the stance of monetary policy, 
suggest that the adjustment could be pronounced. 
On that occasion bond yields moved higher globally, 
despite differences in expectations for monetary 
policy across countries. There was a marked 
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investor retreat from riskier assets, triggering sharp 
depreciations in the currencies of several emerging 
market economies that had been net recipients of 
portfolio inflows in the years prior. In many markets, 
these movements largely unwound when it became 
clear that an increase in the Federal Reserve’s policy 
interest rate was not imminent and as central banks 
in other major advanced economies acted to loosen 
monetary policy. 
A broader concern about the potential for a 
damaging repricing of financial assets in response 
to a shock is that some investors might be 
underestimating the difficulty of exiting a position. 
Reduced dealer inventories of bonds, and the rising 
importance of investment vehicles that may be 
vulnerable to redemption risk in times of stress, such 
as exchange traded funds, have also contributed to 
concerns.
Search for yield behaviour has, however, been 
supportive of financial conditions. The stability of 
euro area banks’ funding profiles became more 
robust to market shocks as they decreased their 
reliance on central bank liquidity. Favourable euro 
area funding conditions have extended to stressed-
economy banks, supported by the ECB’s LTRO 
funding. 
There has also been progress with establishing 
arrangements for the Europe-wide banking 
union. The European Parliament passed banking 
union legislation in April that seeks to reduce the 
reliance of banks on public sector support in a 
crisis. The scheme, which begins in January 2015, 
establishes a common fund for resolving banks, 
requires the imposition of losses on shareholders 
and bondholders before resolution funds can be 
disbursed, and guarantees deposits (up to a cap of 
€100 000).
While European sovereign and banking risks have 
lessened, a decline in investor risk appetite could 
hamper recent improvements in euro area banks’ 
capital and balance sheet positions. The recent 
failure of the third-largest Portuguese lender, Banco 
Espírito Santo (BES), has heightened focus on the 
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ECB’s Asset Quality Review (AQR) and stress test 
exercise, for which results are due in the second 
half of October. Many banks have pre-positioned 
themselves by increasing capital issuance and 
provisioning coverage.
Conditions in Asian financial markets have been 
comparably stable over recent months, following 
periods of investor retreat in both mid 2013 and 
early 2014. Sovereign and corporate bond spreads 
have generally been stable or narrowed over the 
past six  months (Graph  1.6), in line with broader 
global search for yield behaviour as well as ongoing 
portfolio inflows. Equity prices have also increased 
strongly since the beginning of the year, with markets 
in India and Indonesia particularly buoyed following 
elections. Most exchange rates for emerging Asia 
have been relatively stable and Asian central banks 
have generally continued to increase their gross 
foreign currency reserves.
Nonetheless, financial system vulnerabilities in 
emerging Asia remain. Very low interest rates in 
the advanced economies and brighter growth 
prospects in emerging markets post-crisis have been 
supportive of rapid credit growth in many Asian 
economies in recent years, potentially increasing 
their vulnerability to adverse shocks (Graph  1.7). In 
China, around half of all new credit has originated 
outside the prudentially regulated sector. Concerns 
about asset quality have been rising in China, amid 
the slower pace of economic growth and a more 
recent softening of conditions in the residential 
property market. 
In addition to growth in bank-intermediated credit, 
non-financial corporate bond issuance has picked 
up in many economies in emerging Asia, some of 
which has been denominated in foreign currencies. 
This may be of particular concern if exchange 
rates depreciate further in response to revised 
expectations for monetary policy in advanced 
economies. An associated vulnerability is that 
liquidity in the secondary market for bonds in some 
emerging economies is relatively low, with subdued 
trading volumes despite strong issuance. Low 
Graph 1.7
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Graph 1.6
liquidity in secondary markets could amplify asset 
price dynamics under stress.
banking Systems in Advanced 
economies
bank profitability and capital
Profitability in the major banking systems has 
remained mixed over the past six months 
(Graph 1.8). Drivers of weakness have varied. In the 
United States and Japan, net interest margins have 
narrowed further. Loan-loss provisions continue to 
be high for the large euro area banks, but are now 
around pre-crisis levels for the large US and UK 
7financial stability review |  s e p t e m b e r  2014
banks (Graph 1.9). Legal expenses, arising from past 
dubious practices and increased regulatory scrutiny, 
are detracting noticeably from profits for some banks 
in the United States and in Europe. Uncertainty 
remains over banks’ ongoing exposure to litigation, 
with additional provisioning expected to weigh on 
future profits.
On average, large banks in advanced economies 
increased their Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital 
ratios over the past six months, with all the global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) reporting CET1 
holdings in excess of their fully phased-in Basel  III 
regulatory minima including G-SIB surcharges 
(Graph  1.10). The large continental European banks 
improved their capital ratios mainly through issuance. 
In contrast, banks in the United States did so primarily 
through retained earnings. The increase in the United 
States also partly reflected responses to increased 
regulatory scrutiny of planned capital distributions 
(such as dividends), through the annual stress test 
and capital review. Preparations for the introduction 
of the supplementary US leverage ratio requirement, 
which is higher than the Basel III requirement, also 
contributed. 
Graph 1.8 Graph 1.9
20122010200820062004 2014
-20
-10
0
10
20
%
-20
-10
0
10
20
%
Large Banks’ Return on Equity*
After tax and minority interests
Canada
Australia
UK
Euro areaUS
Japan
* Number of banks: Australia (4), Canada (6), euro area (8), Japan (3),
UK (4) and US (6); adjusted for significant mergers and acquisitions;
reporting periods vary across jurisdictions; estimates used where
banks have not reported for June 2014
Sources: Banks’ Annual and Interim Reports; Bloomberg; RBA; SNL Financial
Bank Profits and Impairments*
Large banks in advanced economies
US
20102006 2014
-50
0
50
US$b
-50
0
50
US$b
Loan losses
Japan
2010 2014
-1.5
0.0
1.5
¥t
-1.5
0.0
1.5
¥t
Net profit
Euro area
20102006 2014
-30
0
30
€b
-30
0
30
€b UK
2010 2014
-30
0
30
£b
-30
0
30
£b
Non-recurring expenses**
Australia
20102006
-30
-15
0
15
A$b
-30
-15
0
15
A$b Canada
2010 2014
-30
-15
0
15
C$b
-30
-15
0
15
C$b
* Number of banks: Australia (4), Canada (6), euro area (6), Japan (3),
UK (4) and US (6); adjusted for significant mergers and acquisitions;
reporting periods vary across jurisdictions
** Includes, but is not limited to, goodwill and non-loan asset adjustments
and one-off legal expenses; US data include only one-off legal
expenses since 2008
Sources: Bloomberg; RBA; SNL Financial
Graph 1.10
 Mid 2013
 End 2013
 Mid 2014
US Euro area Other
Europe*
UK Japan**
0
5
10
%
0
5
10
%
Advanced Economy G-SIBs’ CET1 Ratios
Fully phased in Basel III; asset-weighted average
* Includes Credit Suisse, Nordea and UBS
** Japanese banks’ CET1 ratios are based on transitional Basel III
requirements
Sources: Bloomberg; RBA; SNL Financial
Asset performance
For the first time since before the global financial crisis, 
in the first half of 2014, all major advanced economy 
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banking systems have shown signs of improvement 
in asset quality (Graph  1.11). In the euro area, the 
aggregate NPL ratio fell modestly, though it remains 
elevated. In particular, NPL ratios fell for many 
stressed-economy banks, including those in Ireland, 
Italy and Spain, while in the rest of the euro area NPL 
ratios have been stable for several years. A number 
of euro area banks increased provisions in late 2013, 
especially for loans they had been forbearing on, to 
strengthen their balance sheets ahead of the AQR, 
which is based on banks’ balance sheets at the end of 
2013. For other euro area banks, loan-loss provisions 
have fallen to pre-crisis levels. In the United States, 
asset quality improvements have been driven by 
continued declines in non-performance rates for 
residential and commercial real estate loans.
bank funding conditions
Funding conditions have remained favourable 
for large banks in major advanced economies 
as wholesale borrowing costs continued to fall 
and spreads on bank bonds continued to narrow 
(Graph 1.12). Spreads on short-term interbank loans 
remain close to their lowest levels since 2007. Bond 
issuance by US and euro area banks has picked up, 
though increases in banks’  total assets over the first 
half of 2014 were largely funded by an increase in 
the stock of deposits. In Europe, there has been 
strong issuance of Basel  III compliant Additional 
Tier 1 capital instruments, reflecting the introduction 
of European regulations and increased demand from 
investors.
Within the euro area, large stressed-economy banks 
reported lower interbank borrowing costs at longer 
maturities. Along with favourable wholesale funding 
conditions, this has helped banks reduce their 
reliance on the ECB’s LTROs. 
Credit conditions
Consistent with the ongoing recovery in economic 
conditions and banks’  balance sheets, credit 
conditions in the major advanced economies 
seem to have improved. In the June quarter 2014, 
bank lending standards are reported to have 
simultaneously eased in both the United States and 
in Europe, and for all types of loans, for the first time 
since 2007 (Graph 1.13). 
Bank lending is now growing in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, after prolonged periods 
of weakness. The pace of decline in the euro area 
9financial stability review |  s e p t e m b e r  2014
has moderated, though subdued lending to small 
and medium enterprises remains a concern for 
policymakers. Authorities have expressed concern 
about housing price and credit dynamics in several 
advanced economies, including the United Kingdom 
and Canada. While housing credit growth has not 
been unusually strong in these economies, housing 
leverage has remained elevated, so households 
could be vulnerable to an unexpected increase in 
mortgage rates or a fall in housing prices.
The recent period of bank deleveraging, 
in conjunction with the current search for 
yield environment, has seen a trend towards 
disintermediation in many advanced economies. 
With corporate bond yields remaining low, 
private non-financial corporations’ use of 
non-intermediated debt funding has grown more 
quickly than intermediated debt for many advanced 
economies in recent years (Graph 1.14).
Graph 1.13 Graph 1.14
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New Zealand
Developments in New Zealand remain an important 
focus given the large Australian banks’ operations 
there. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) 
has been concerned about high household 
indebtedness and banks’ exposures to the housing 
market in an environment of rising housing prices. In 
response, in 2013 the RBNZ placed temporary limits 
on high loan-to-valuation ratio (LVR) lending and 
increased banks’ capital and liquidity requirements; 
the government also moved to expedite building 
approvals to address supply shortages. Banks have 
adhered to the RBNZ’s limit on high-LVR lending, with 
the share of new housing lending with a LVR over 
80 per cent falling to below 10 per cent from over 
30 per cent (Graph 1.15). Over the past six months, 
the RBNZ has also increased the overnight cash rate 
by one percentage point. Annual housing price 
growth has eased in some cities but remains strong 
overall. While the RBNZ had planned to unwind the 
high-LVR limits at the end of 2014, it has noted that 
a recent increase in housing demand from increased 
net migration may delay this. (For further discussion 
on Australian banks’ exposure to New Zealand, see 
‘The Australian Financial System’ chapter.)
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banking Systems in emerging  
east Asia
China
Chinese banks remain highly profitable, and 
continue to report high capital ratios and low NPL 
ratios. Nonetheless, risks posed by the ongoing 
build-up of debt could be rising given the slower 
pace of economic growth compared to a few years 
ago. Part of this build-up in debt has been in the 
non-prudentially regulated ‘shadow banking’ sector, 
due, in part, to limits placed on bank lending and 
deposit interest rates (Graph  1.16). Borrowers in 
certain sectors, such as property developers and 
local governments, are restricted from accessing 
bank loans, so they access non-bank finance instead. 
Much of this lending is funded in ways that create 
off-balance sheet exposures for the banking system. 
For example, banks sell wealth management 
products on behalf of trust companies, which 
then invest in a variety of assets, including loans 
to developers and local governments. Often these 
channels involve the risks of long-term lending 
funded by short-term borrowing and high leverage, 
yet their regulatory supervision and internal risk 
assessment tend to be weaker than for the formal 
banking sector.
Graph 1.15 Graph 1.16
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Concerns about asset quality in China have been 
heightened by softening conditions in the residential 
property market. After rising strongly in recent years, 
property prices and sales volumes have declined 
in recent months amid reports of excess supply in 
some cities (Graph 1.17). This has prompted several 
local governments to review policies that had been 
aimed at restricting property activity. 
Weakness in the property market could also have 
implications for the performance of Chinese banks’ 
loans to property developers and local governments, 
many of which generate a significant portion of their 
revenue from land sales. Though lending to these 
sectors accounts for a relatively small share of banks’ 
on-balance sheet lending, banks could also be 
exposed through shadow banking activities. More 
broadly, land is an important source of collateral 
for financing in China and housing is an important 
store of wealth. While China has been able to 
manage a small number of defaults in trust funds 
and corporate bonds, a more widespread series of 
private-sector defaults – potentially associated with 
a sharp correction in property prices – could be 
more damaging.
The focus on risks to China partly reflect China’s large 
contribution to global growth. Foreign banking 
systems’ exposures to China are generally small 
compared to their total assets, although they are 
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growing quickly in a number of countries, including 
Australia, and are sizeable for some individual 
foreign institutions. Banking linkages with China 
are particularly large for Hong Kong, where such 
exposures make up around 20  per cent of system 
assets; this reflects the close ties between the two 
economies, as well as Hong Kong’s role as a major 
financial centre. For Australia, the links would instead 
be largely macroeconomic, including through the 
commodity sector.
Other east Asia
Conditions in Asian banking systems have remained 
generally favourable in the past six months. Most 
banks in Asia continue to report high rates of return 
on equity compared to advanced economies 
(Graph 1.18). The level of profits has been supported 
by strong growth in bank lending and non-interest 
income. NPL ratios are generally very low, although 
they are typically a lagging indicator and there have 
been signs of deteriorating asset performance in 
certain economies and sectors (Graph  1.19). Banks’ 
aggregate capital ratios continued to be well 
above Basel  III minimum requirements. The notable 
exception to the otherwise strong profitability in 
Asian banking systems is South Korea, where banks’ 
return on equity remains low relative to its peers in 
the region. This partly reflects the impact of corporate 
failures in the construction, shipbuilding and shipping 
sectors on a number of banks.
While reported NPL ratios remain low, higher 
indebtedness in many Asian economies raises 
concerns about borrowers’ ability to repay if interest 
rates rise or economic conditions deteriorate. 
Property price growth has recently moderated in 
several economies. This has followed a moderation 
in economic growth in some economies. However, 
some local authorities, particularly in Hong Kong and 
Malaysia, remain concerned about price levels.  R
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Box A 
Recent Trends in the Issuance of Basel III 
Compliant Contingent Capital Instruments
Changes to the Basel framework for bank capital 
and liquidity requirements, collectively referred to 
as Basel III, have encouraged banks to issue capital 
instruments that are classified as debt, but which 
can be written down or converted to equity. These 
instruments are a subset of both the wider class 
of securities called contingent convertible capital 
instruments, and non-common equity (NCE) 
regulatory capital. 
The increased supply of Basel III compliant NCE 
capital instruments with contingent convertible 
features has coincided with a period of strong 
investor demand for high-yielding debt, creating 
buoyant market conditions in recent years. This box 
describes recent trends and drivers of issuance of 
these capital instruments, their potential benefits 
and some risks surrounding them.
Definitions
Bank capital, in its simplest form, is equal to the 
portion of the value of a bank’s assets that is not 
matched by liabilities owing to other parties, 
such as deposits or debt. It represents a bank’s 
ability to absorb losses on its assets. The Basel III 
capital framework, which was finalised in June 
2011, introduced a minimum level of common 
equity – called Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital – which is the most loss-absorbing form 
of bank capital. Banks are not obliged to repay the 
principal of common equity outside of liquidation 
or make distributions such as dividend payments. 
In liquidation, common equity represents the most 
subordinated type of claim.  
Non-common equity regulatory capital instruments 
are sometimes called hybrid securities because they 
have characteristics of both equity and debt – some 
are also referred to as CoCos given their contingent 
convertible nature. Hybrid capital instruments with 
characteristics that are most similar to common 
equity are classified as Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital 
under Basel III and are designed to absorb losses 
while the bank is still a going concern. Like common 
equity, AT1 capital instruments do not have a 
maturity date and distributions such as dividends 
and coupon payments are fully discretionary; in 
liquidation, AT1 capital instruments are senior 
only to common equity. AT1 capital includes 
preferred shares and debt instruments that have 
loss-absorption triggers which allow the principal 
to be written down or converted to common 
equity during times of stress.1 This has the effect of 
strengthening the banks’ capital position at a time 
when raising additional equity would otherwise 
be difficult. Allowing the issuer to miss coupon 
payments can also reduce pressure on liquidity.
Tier 2 (T2) capital is a lower-quality form of regulatory 
capital that is designed to absorb losses when a 
bank fails (that is, becomes a ‘gone concern’). T2 
capital instruments must have an original maturity 
of at least five years and, like AT1 capital instruments, 
have no ‘step-up’ clauses or other incentives to 
redeem;2 in  liquidation, T2 capital is senior only to 
CET1 and AT1. 
1 The Basel  III framework only requires AT1 to contain a numerical 
trigger when considered a liability for accounting purposes. A 
numerical loss-absorption trigger is activated when the CET1 capital 
ratio of the bank falls below a certain level (e.g. below 5.125 per cent 
of risk-weighted assets). This is in addition to the non-viability trigger.
2 Basel III no longer recognises hybrid instruments which provide an 
incentive for the issuer to redeem through features such as ‘step-up’ 
clauses, where coupon payments can increase (‘step-up’) from one 
period to another.
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To facilitate loss absorption on a gone-concern basis, 
both AT1 and T2 capital instruments must, where not 
enforced by legislation, incorporate a contractual 
feature allowing the principal to be written down 
or converted to common equity if the relevant 
regulator determines that the bank is no longer able 
to support itself in the private market. This feature, 
which is often called the point of non-viability 
trigger, is designed to ensure losses can be imposed 
on all capital holders before other resolution actions 
are taken, including those that may involve taxpayers 
being exposed through government intervention.
Issuance 
Within the class of Basel III compliant NCE, losses 
can be attributed to capital holders in different ways 
when a trigger event occurs (Graph A1). For example, 
full principal write-down yields an absolute loss for 
the individual investor. In contrast, equity conversion 
may allow investors to recoup losses should share 
prices recover, while diluting the stake of existing 
shareholders. Temporary write-down/write-up 
mechanisms would write down principal by the 
amount necessary to return the bank’s capital ratio 
to the trigger level; these mechanisms also allow the 
issuer to write up principal should the bank return to 
profitability.
The designs of triggers also vary. Most AT1 triggers are 
tied to a CET1 ratio of 5.125 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets, consistent with the Basel  III requirement for 
instruments intended as going-concern capital, 
though some are higher. Numerical triggers are 
typically not required for T2 instruments, which 
tend to rely only on the point of non-viability trigger 
(triggered at the discretion of the national authority), 
though Swiss gone-concern capital instruments 
require numerical triggers at 5 per cent of risk-
weighted assets (Table A1). At least one recent issue 
has included multiple triggers (based on the capital 
ratios of either the bank or its holding company) and 
some issuance in Asia can be triggered by either 
the home or host regulators. Regulatory call options 
(allowing the issuer to buy back the instrument if 
regulatory requirements change) are a very common 
feature across different issuers.
Issuance has increased strongly in recent years 
(Graph A2), as banks have moved to raise capital to 
meet the stricter Basel  III capital requirements and 
to replace maturing instruments issued under the 
Basel  II framework. Meanwhile, the low interest rate 
environment has supported investor demand; these 
securities offer higher yields than senior debt or term 
deposits, reflecting their higher risk. 
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Issuance has been strong in Europe where regulators 
require all AT1 capital instruments to contain a trigger 
tied to regulatory capital ratios. For some countries 
within Europe, issuance has been attractive because 
coupon payments are tax deductible for the issuer. 
European issuers of Basel  III compliant NCE have 
tended to offer loss-absorption mechanisms with 
the potential to recoup losses after a trigger event. 
Issuance by Swiss banks has been encouraged by 
regulations requiring systemically important banks to 
hold up to 9 per cent of risk-weighted assets as NCE 
with both numerical and discretionary regulatory 
triggers. In contrast, regulators in the United States 
have opted to rely entirely on statute at resolution to 
comply with Basel  III loss-absorption requirements, 
and have indicated they will continue to study the 
advantages and disadvantages of banks issuing 
instruments with contingent convertible triggers as 
regulatory capital. Issuance of these instruments in 
the United States has therefore been negligible. 
Table A1: Recent Examples of Basel III Compliant 
Contingent Convertible Bond Issuance
Issuing  
Bank
Issue
Date
Coupon Amount CET1(c) 
trigger
Loss-absorption
MechanismPer cent Billions Country Ranking(b)
Banco Popular 
Español Oct 13 11.5 EUR 0.5 Spain AT1 5.125%
Principal  
write-down
Barclays Nov 13 8.25 USD 2.0 UK AT1 7% Equity conversion
Crédit  
Agricole Apr 14 6.5 EUR 1.0 France AT1
5.125%  
and 7%(d)
Temp write-down/
write-up
Deutsche  
Bank May 14 7.125 GBP 0.65 Germany AT1 5.125%
Temp write-down/
write-up
UBS May 14 5.125 USD 2.5 Switzerland T2 5%
Principal  
write-down (full)
Shengjing  
Bank May 14 6.18 CNY 2.2 China T2 No (PoNV)
Principal 
write-down (full)
(a) Sample selected to emphasise the variety of unique features across and within regions
(b) AT1 or T2 capital ranking as identified by the issuer
(c)  CET1 ratio to risk-weighted assets trigger specified where applicable; discretionary point of non-viability (PoNV) trigger identified 
where CET1 triggers are not required
(d) CET1 trigger tied to both the parent (7 per cent) and the issuing bank level (5.125 per cent) CET1 ratio
Sources: Bloomberg; Dealogic; RBA
Australian banks have issued some AT1 and T2 
instruments consistent with APRA’s implementation 
of the Basel III framework (see ‘The Australian Financial 
System’ chapter); while in Asia, some T2 instruments 
with the required discretionary triggers have been 
issued.
In line with buoyant market conditions, the spread to 
benchmark for contingent convertible instruments, 
as well as the spread between high trigger and 
low trigger instruments narrowed over 2013 and 
early 2014, before ticking up in July (Graph  A3). 
One particular deal was postponed when the 
scale of problems at the failed Portuguese lender 
Banco Espírito Santo first became evident as the 
market demanded a higher yield than the issuer 
was prepared to offer. In early September, another 
issuer reported under-subscription. These incidents 
suggest that growth in demand for this class of 
instrument might be significantly reduced if the 
price of risk was to increase.
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potential Risks
As a general proposition, if banks have more loss-
absorbing capital on their balance sheets, the 
resilience of the banking sector improves; this is a 
positive development for financial stability. That said, 
some regulators have raised concerns that some 
investors could be underestimating the probability 
of a trigger event, implying that some NCE issues 
may be mispriced. A significant reassessment of the 
risks could impose heavy losses on investors and 
substantially increase banks’ funding costs, especially 
as this could coincide with increased stress in the 
banking system. 
In addition, contingent convertible instruments may 
distort incentives in stressful situations. Bank share 
prices could come under pressure if holders of these 
instruments, anticipating losses, short-sell bank 
shares, aiming to close their positions with the shares 
generated at conversion. Shareholders may also sell 
before the conversion of these instruments if they 
anticipate losses due to the subsequent dilution of 
their holdings.
Regulators’ incentive to trigger conversion, and 
therefore the capacity of these instruments to 
absorb losses, might also be affected by the type of 
investor facing those losses. Ideally, NCE regulatory 
capital should not be held by systemically important 
institutions, lest they provide another mechanism for 
contagion to spread.3 
A sample of European AT1 issuance indicates that 
asset managers and hedge funds in continental 
Europe and the United Kingdom have purchased the 
majority of NCE (Table A2). Some purchases by asset 
managers are likely to be on behalf of retail clients. 
Several regulators globally, including the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, the 
European Securities and Market Authority, and the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
have expressed concerns that some retail investors 
may not fully understand the risk associated with 
these highly complex capital instruments, particularly 
given the market’s early stage of development and 
the lack of experience with contingent triggers. The 
FCA has also imposed a temporary restriction on the 
distribution of contingent convertible instruments 
to certain types of retail investors, effective from 
1 October 2014.  R
3 For this reason, Basel III requires that cross-holdings of any capital 
instruments are deducted from regulatory capital of the same kind.
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Table A2: European AT1 Investors(a)
Share of issuance, per cent
Investor Type 2013 2014
Asset managers 63 59
Hedge funds 12 21
Insurance/pension funds 6 9
Banks/private banks 16 10
Other 3 1
(a)  From a sample of 11 AT1 European contingent convertible 
instruments with data available on investor distribution
Sources: Dealogic; RBA
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2. the Australian Financial System
A number of the key trends evident in the Australian 
banking system over recent years have continued 
since the previous Review: banks’ capital ratios edged 
up again; their asset performance continued to 
steadily improve; and their profitability remained 
robust. In addition to their current low bad and 
doubtful debt charges, the major banks’ higher 
profitability relative to international peers appears to 
partly reflect operational efficiencies – the cost-to-
income ratios of the major banks are featured in 
‘Box B: Australian Major Banks’ Cost-to-income Ratios’ 
of this Review.
Australian banks are benefiting from improved 
wholesale funding conditions globally and, in turn, 
an easing in overall deposit market competition. 
Lower funding costs are facilitating strong price 
competition in housing and commercial property 
lending. Fast growth in property prices and investor 
activity has increased property-related risks to the 
macroeconomy. It is important for macroeconomic 
and financial stability that banks set their risk 
appetite and lending standards at least in line 
with current best practice, and take into account 
system-wide risks in property markets in their 
lending decisions. Over the past year APRA has 
increased the intensity of its supervision around 
housing market risks facing banks, and is currently 
consulting on new guidance for sound risk 
management practices in housing lending.
Shadow banking is an area of focus in international 
regulatory reforms, and this Review contains an 
update on the size and composition of the shadow 
banking sector in Australia. Shadow banking activity 
in Australia has declined noticeably since 2007 and 
the sector accounts for only a small share of financial 
system assets. This, along with limited credit and 
funding links to the regular banking system, means 
that the shadow banking sector currently poses little 
systemic risk in Australia.
Profitability remains strong overall in the general 
insurance industry, supported by a benign claims 
environment. Buoyant conditions in the housing 
market have also contributed to better profit 
performance by lenders mortgage insurers. 
Conditions in the life insurance industry remain more 
challenging, partly reflecting previous under-pricing 
of risk on some policies.
Asset performance
Asset performance is a key indicator of Australian 
banks’ soundness and therefore a focus of financial 
stability analysis. Over the first half of 2014, the 
asset performance of Australian banks continued its 
steady improvement of recent years. In the banks’ 
domestic portfolio, the ratio of non-performing 
assets to total loans was 1.1 per cent at June 2014, 
compared with a peak of 1.9 per cent in mid 2010 
(Graph 2.1). This decline mostly reflects a reduction 
in the share of loans classified as impaired (those not 
well secured and with repayments doubtful), while 
the share of loans classified as past due (in arrears 
but well secured) has fallen modestly since its peak 
in 2011.
The reduction in banks’ domestic impaired assets 
since 2008–09 has been concentrated in business 
loans, in particular commercial property loans 
(Graph  2.2). The strong recovery in commercial 
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property prices induced another sharp fall in the 
level of impaired commercial property loans over 
the first half of 2014; the corresponding impairment 
ratio fell a little below that for other business 
exposures. Further improvement in business loan 
performance will likely depend more on how other 
industries perform; notably, the impairment ratio 
remains elevated in the agriculture, fishery, forestry 
& mining category, which accounts for 15 per cent of 
the major banks’ business lending.
The decline in banks’ impaired business assets over 
recent years suggests that the risk profile of their 
business loan portfolios has improved. One indicator 
of this is the share of corporate exposures that are 
assessed to have a relatively high probability of 
defaulting in the following year. (Probabilities of 
default (PDs) are derived from the internal credit risk 
models of those banks authorised by APRA to use 
these models to calculate their minimum regulatory 
capital requirement.) The share of the major banks’ 
corporate exposures assigned a PD of 0.5  per cent 
or greater declined noticeably over the four years to 
June 2014 (Graph  2.3). Some of this decline would 
have resulted from better macroeconomic and 
property market conditions. The underlying quality 
of banks’ business loan portfolios should also have 
strengthened given the tightening in business 
lending standards around 2008–09, thus increasing 
the resiliency of these portfolios to possible future 
adverse macroeconomic circumstances. However, 
as discussed below, it will be important for banks’ 
future loan performance that these gains are 
not compromised by an imprudent loosening 
of business lending standards from their current 
configuration, especially given that the bulk of bank 
credit losses in Australia have historically occurred in 
business lending.
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In contrast to banks’ business lending, the 
performance of banks’ domestic household loan 
portfolios has been broadly steady over recent 
quarters. The non-performing share of banks’ 
housing loans was unchanged over the six months 
to June 2014 (Graph  2.4). Recent housing price 
inflation appears to have reduced the likelihood that 
past due housing loans will become impaired; they 
are also helping banks to dispose of their existing 
stock of troubled housing assets, with a number 
of banks reporting reductions in mortgagees-in-
possession. While the non-performing ratio for 
banks’ personal loans is higher than banks’ other loan 
portfolios, personal lending is typically riskier than 
other types of lending and it represents only a small 
share of banks’ total domestic loans.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Banks’ Non-performing Housing Loans
Source: APRA
2014
Total
%
Domestic books, share of housing loans
%
20122010200820062004
Past due
Impaired
Graph 2.4
Credit Conditions and Lending 
Standards
Growth in banks’ domestic lending has lifted over 
the past six months, after a few years of modest 
growth (Graph  2.5). Housing credit expanded at 
an annualised rate of around 7 per cent over the 
six months to July 2014; growth in investor credit 
continued to strengthen and at nearly 10 per cent 
reached its fastest pace since 2007, well above the 
rate for owner-occupiers. Business credit growth 
also picked up, although it continues to be weighed 
upon by subdued non-mining business investment.
The pick-up in credit growth has been accompanied 
by stronger price competition in some loan markets. 
The ongoing improvement in bank funding 
conditions, including for smaller banks, has aided 
price competition. It will be important for banks’ 
own risk management and, in turn, financial 
stability that they do not respond to revenue 
pressures by loosening lending standards, or 
making ill-considered moves into new markets or 
products. Banks need to ensure that loans originated 
in the current environment can still be serviced by 
borrowers in less favourable circumstances – for 
instance, at higher interest rates or during a period 
of weaker economic conditions. Furthermore, banks 
should be cautious in their property valuations, and 
conscious that extending loans at constant loan-to-
valuation ratios (LVRs) can be riskier when property 
prices are rising strongly, as is currently the case in 
some commercial property and housing markets.
Lending conditions have eased in parts of the 
business loan market. According to industry liaison, 
strong competition among lenders has further 
narrowed margins on corporate loans, particularly 
in the ‘wholesale’ market (i.e. large value loans) and 
for commercial property. Nonetheless, while some 
borrowers continue to secure more favourable 
non-price loan terms, there does not appear to have 
been a widespread relaxation in corporate loan 
standards. Lending conditions appear little changed 
in the small business loan market.
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Business lending by foreign-owned banks has 
increased at a relatively fast pace, driven by 
Asian-owned banks (Graph  2.6). APRA data and 
bank liaison suggest that some of these banks have 
been offering very competitive prices and terms in 
the syndicated loan market; they have also recently 
been active in commercial property lending. Foreign 
bank lending accounts for only 15  per cent of 
total business credit, but it can still contribute to 
overall systemic risk. Over the past decade foreign 
bank branches’ lending in Australia has been quite 
procyclical and may have influenced some asset 
prices, including commercial property prices.
In the residential mortgage market, price 
competition for new borrowers has intensified. 
Fixed rates have been lowered in recent months. 
According to industry liaison, a number of lenders 
have also extended larger discounts on their 
advertised variable rates and broadened the range 
of borrowers that receive these discounts. Banks are 
offering other incentives to attract new borrowers, 
including fee waivers, upfront cash bonuses or 
vouchers. In addition, some banks recently raised 
their commission rates paid to mortgage brokers. 
However, reports from banks and other mortgage 
market participants suggest that, in aggregate, 
banks’ non-price lending standards, such as loan 
serviceability and deposit criteria, have remained 
broadly steady over recent quarters. This seems to 
be supported by APRA data on the composition of 
banks’ housing loan approvals, which suggest that 
the overall risk profile of new housing lending has 
not increased. It is noteworthy that the industry-wide 
share of ‘low-doc’ lending continues to represent 
less than 1 per cent of loan approvals, while the share 
of loans approved with an LVR greater than 90 per 
cent has fallen over the past year (see ‘Household 
and Business Finances’ chapter). That said, strong 
investor activity in the housing market has meant 
that the share of investor loans approved with LVRs 
between 80  per cent and 90  per cent has risen. 
The shares of interest-only loans for both investors 
and owner-occupiers have also drifted higher, and 
average loan sizes (relative to average income) have 
increased.
Although, in aggregate, bank housing lending 
standards do not appear to have eased lately, a 
crucial question for both macroeconomic and 
financial stability is whether lending practices across 
the banking industry are conservative enough 
for the current combination of low interest rates, 
strong housing price growth and higher household 
indebtedness than in past decades. Moreover, 
lending to investors is expanding at a fast pace, 
which could be funding additional speculative 
activity in the housing market and encourage other 
(more marginal) borrowers to increase debt. Lending 
growth is varied across geographical markets and 
individual lenders, which may suggest a build-up in 
loan concentrations and therefore correlated risks 
within the banking industry. The Reserve Bank’s 
assessment is that the risk from the current strength 
in housing markets is more likely to be to future 
household spending than to lenders’ balance sheets. 
However, the direct risks to banks will rise if current 
rates of growth in investor lending and housing 
prices persist, or increase further.
In light of the current risks, APRA has increased the 
focus of its supervision on banks’ housing lending. 
Specifically, it has:
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 • begun a regular supervisory survey of a broader 
range of risk indicators for banks with material 
housing lending
 • released a draft Prudential Practice Guide (PPG) 
for housing lending that outlined expectations 
for banks’ risk management frameworks, 
serviceability assessments, deposit criteria 
and residential property valuations.1 By way of 
example, prudent serviceability assessments 
are seen to involve: an interest rate add-on 
to the mortgage rate, in conjunction with an 
interest rate ‘floor’, to ensure the borrower can 
continue to service the loan if interest rates 
increase; a buffer above standard measures of 
household living expenses; and the exclusion, 
or reduction in value, of uncertain income 
streams. While much of the guidance in the PPG 
is already common practice within the industry, 
it is nonetheless important that practices are not 
deficient at even a minority of lenders
 • written to individual bank boards and chief risk 
officers asking them to specify how they are 
monitoring housing loan standards and ensuing 
risks to the economy
1 For further details, see APRA (2014), ‘Draft Prudential Practice Guide: 
APG 223 – Residential Mortgage Lending’, May.
 • assessed the resilience of banks’ housing 
loan (and other) portfolios to large negative 
macroeconomic shocks, including a severe 
downturn in the housing market, as part of its 
regular stress testing of banks’ balance sheets.
In addition, the Reserve Bank is discussing with 
APRA, and other members of the Council of Financial 
Regulators (CFR), further steps that might be taken 
to reinforce sound lending practices, particularly for 
lending to investors.
International exposures
Australian-owned banks’ international exposures 
arise from the activities of their overseas branches 
or subsidiaries, as well as the direct cross-border 
activities of their Australian-based operations. 
International exposures were just under one-quarter 
of Australian-owned banks’ global consolidated 
assets at March 2014 (Table 2.1).
The largest international exposure of the 
Australian-owned banks continues to be 
New  Zealand, since each of the Australian major 
banks have a significant presence there. The major 
Table 2.1: Australian-owned Banks’ International Exposures
Ultimate risk basis, as at March
Level Share of 
international 
exposures
Share of global 
consolidated assets
2014 2014 2014 2009
$ billion Per cent Per cent Per cent
New Zealand 323 40.1 9.4 9.6
United Kingdom 135 16.8 3.9 5.2
United States 101 12.6 2.9 2.0
Asia(a) 147 18.2 4.3 1.2
  – China 39 4.9 1.1 0.1
Europe 54 6.6 1.6 2.6
Other 46 5.7 1.3 1.1
Total 807 100.0 23.4 21.8
(a) Includes offshore centres Hong Kong and Singapore
Sources: APRA; RBA
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banks’ operations in New Zealand are similar to their 
Australian operations: they focus largely on lending 
to households and businesses, although within this, 
lending to agriculture is a higher share because of 
the importance of the dairy industry in New Zealand. 
Loan performance at the New Zealand subsidiaries 
has continued to improve following the peak in their 
non-performing asset ratio of over 2 per cent in early 
2011. Despite this improvement, there are some 
risks in the New Zealand financial system that could 
adversely affect future loan performance. Banks’ 
housing market exposures have garnered particular 
attention recently given strong growth in housing 
prices and the high level of household debt in the 
context of the economic volatility that New Zealand 
has historically experienced. Housing price growth 
remains strong in some major cities despite rising 
interest rates and recent policy measures restricting 
high-LVR lending. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
has also expressed concern about high debt burdens 
for some agricultural producers, which increases 
their susceptibility to an adverse shock, such as a 
decline in agricultural prices.
Australian-owned banks’ aggregate exposures to the 
United Kingdom are substantial, even though they 
have fallen relative to total international exposures 
over recent years. In the United  Kingdom, the 
non-performing asset ratio has been quite high for 
some time because of ongoing difficult economic and 
property market conditions (Graph  2.7). NAB, which 
has a large UK operation, has reported publicly that 
it sold a sizeable portfolio of UK impaired commercial 
property loans in July, but at a little above its book 
value, consistent with some improvement in UK 
commercial property markets. NAB’s UK operations 
have also suffered sizeable losses and uncertainty 
because of some conduct issues that have been 
experienced more generally across the UK financial 
sector, specifically around payment protection 
insurance and interest-rate hedging products.
Exposures to Asia represent almost one-fifth 
of Australian-owned banks’ total international 
exposures. These exposures have grown substantially 
over the past five years, particularly those to China. 
A key motivation for the Australian major banks’ 
expansion into Asia has been to facilitate the large 
and growing trade and investment flows between 
Australia and Asia (indeed, this trend is also mirrored 
in the Asian banks’ expansions in Australia noted 
above). Related to this, the majority of their exposures 
to Asia are shorter term and trade-related, which 
typically have lower funding and credit risks than 
long-term lending (Graph  2.8). Even so, expansion 
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Graph 2.9into Asian markets still poses a range of risks that 
banks need to manage carefully. This includes 
operational risks, given that conducting business 
in different jurisdictions adds to the complexity of a 
bank’s operations. Further growth in exposures also 
increases the chance that direct financial linkages 
will be a channel by which any disruptions in Asia 
are transmitted to the Australian banking system (in 
addition to macroeconomic and global wholesale 
funding market channels).
Funding and Liquidity
The liability side of Australian banks’ balance sheets 
is  also affected by international financial and 
economic developments. Turbulent conditions in 
global capital markets created wholesale funding 
pressures for Australian banks after the onset of 
the financial crisis, but market conditions have 
been gradually improving since around the middle 
of 2012 as investor risk appetite and search for 
yield behaviour has strengthened (see ‘The Global 
Financial Environment’ chapter). Reflecting this, 
secondary market spreads on the major banks’ 
3–5  year senior unsecured bonds are currently at 
their lowest levels since 2007 (Graph 2.9). In addition, 
bonds issued at longer maturities or by lower rated 
banks are being more readily absorbed by markets 
than previously.
Australian banks have increased their net bond 
issuance as conditions in wholesale funding 
markets have become more favourable. Australian 
banks issued just under $69 billion in bonds in the 
first half of 2014, around $14 billion more than the 
previous six months and $10 billion more than their 
bond maturities in this period (Graph 2.10). Covered 
bonds remained a small share of total bond issuance 
despite relatively favourable pricing on these 
instruments. Banks have currently issued about 
40  per cent of their regulatory limit for covered 
bonds, leaving ample scope to increase issuance if 
unsecured bond market conditions deteriorate.
Conditions in the residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) market have also strengthened. 
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Primary market issuance spreads on senior RMBS 
tranches have tightened further this year for both 
bank and non-bank issuers, and issuance volumes 
have increased (Graph  2.11). Recent momentum in 
securitisation markets has been relatively beneficial 
for smaller institutions’ funding, given they have more 
limited access to bond markets than the major banks.
Improved wholesale funding market conditions 
have also enabled some easing in deposit market 
competition, and over recent quarters banks’ 
share of deposit funding has stopped rising. 
Banks report declines specifically in spreads on 
short-term deposits from financial institutions 
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and large corporations, consistent with these 
being treated less favourably under the upcoming 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement. While 
competition for retail deposits remains relatively 
strong overall, retail deposit rates have generally 
fallen relative to wholesale market rates over recent 
quarters. Banks are likely to further adjust the pricing 
and terms of their deposit products in the lead-up to 
the commencement of the LCR on 1 January 2015. 
The recent pick-up in credit growth has meant that 
the major banks’ net deposit flows are no longer 
exceeding their net credit flows, as was the case in 
previous years (Graph 2.12).
profitability
The improvement in banks’ overall asset performance 
has been an important contributor to their profit 
growth over recent years, and this trend continued 
in the most recent period. The major banks’ 
aggregate charge for bad and doubtful debts fell by 
17 per cent in their latest half-yearly results and, for 
the 2014 financial year as a whole, it is expected to 
decline to a historically low level as a share of assets 
(Graph  2.13). Aggregate profit of the major banks 
was a little over $14 billion in their latest half-yearly 
results, an increase of around 13  per cent on the 
corresponding period a year earlier (Graph 2.14). In 
addition to lower bad and doubtful debt charges, 
profit growth was supported by higher net interest 
income: stronger growth in interest-earning assets 
more than offset a small decline in the aggregate net 
interest margin arising from strong competition in 
lending markets. After declining in 2013, operating 
expenses increased over the year to the latest half, 
reflecting higher staff and investment-related costs. 
The major banks’ annual return on equity is expected 
to be 15 per cent in their 2014 financial year, similar 
to the average return they recorded over the 
2010–13 period.
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Graph 2.14 Looking ahead, equity analysts are forecasting the 
major banks’ profit growth to moderate, to 9 per cent 
in 2015 and 5 per cent in 2016. This is partly because 
bad and doubtful debt charges are now at low levels 
and will no longer provide the impetus to profit 
growth that they have in recent years. In addition, 
analysts expect the major banks’ net interest margins 
to compress further, mainly due to competition in 
lending markets.
Aggregate profit for the three regional banks 
(Suncorp, Bank of Queensland, and Bendigo and 
Adelaide Bank) was $449  million in their latest 
half-yearly results. This follows a small aggregate loss 
in the corresponding period a year earlier, which 
mainly resulted from losses on Suncorp’s sale of a 
portfolio of non-performing commercial property 
and corporate loans that had been in run-off. In 
contrast to the major banks, regional banks’ profit 
was supported by a small rise in their net interest 
margin (Graph 2.15). Foreign-owned banks’ profit in 
the six months to March 2014 was 20 per cent higher 
than the same period a year earlier. This increase was 
largely due to a significant fall in bad and doubtful 
debts at foreign branches, and a moderate rise in 
aggregate non-interest income.
Over recent years, the Australian major banks’ 
returns on equity have been well above those 
recorded by large banks in many other advanced 
economy banking systems (see ‘The Global 
Financial Environment’ chapter). This partly reflects 
the relatively stronger asset performance of the 
Australian major banks. Another factor is their lower 
cost-to-income ratios than large banks in Europe and 
the United States, with the disparity having increased 
since the onset of the financial crisis (see ‘Box B: 
Australian Major Banks’ Cost-to-income Ratios’). The 
reduction in the major banks’ aggregate cost-to-
income ratio has been an offset to the decline in their 
net interest margin over the past couple of decades. 
However, given the relatively low level of this 
measure of operational efficiency, there is a question 
as to how much the major banks’ costs can be further 
contained in future without their risk management 
capabilities or controls being affected.
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Capital
Robust bank profitability has underpinned a further 
strengthening in the Australian banking system’s 
capital position. Banks’ aggregate Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio rose by 0.4  percentage 
points over the six months to June 2014, to 9  per 
cent of risk-weighted assets (RWAs), largely reflecting 
the accumulation of retained earnings.  Banks’ total 
regulatory capital ratio rose in line with this, to stand 
at 12.3 per cent at June 2014.
Banks’ issuance of non-common-equity capital 
instruments (Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments, 
that are sometimes referred to as ‘hybrids’) has 
been sizeable so far this year, consistent with 
the trend in a number of large banking systems 
internationally (see ‘Box A: Recent Trends in the 
Issuance of Basel III Compliant Contingent Capital 
Instruments’) (Graph 2.16). Investor take-up of these 
capital instruments continues to be supported by 
their high yields relative to some less risky financial 
products given the low interest rate environment, 
although recent strong demand has pushed down 
yields (relative to benchmark interest rates). Retail 
investors, particularly self-managed superannuation 
funds, have been the predominant buyers of these 
instruments. However, banks report that institutional 
investors (including foreign investors) have been 
significant purchasers of Tier 2 instruments this year, 
having become more comfortable with pricing the 
risk that a ‘non-viability’ trigger event will occur, 
which would result in the instrument being written 
down or converted to common equity.
In addition to the increase in banks’ common equity 
and non-common-equity capital, banks’ capital 
ratios also benefited from slow growth in aggregate 
RWAs  – that is, the denominator of the ratio – over 
the first half (Table 2.2). The credit risk component, 
which accounts for the bulk of total RWAs, grew 
at a slower pace than banks’ on-balance sheet 
lending over this period. In addition, the market risk 
Table 2.2: Australian Banks’ Risk-weighted Assets
As at June 2014
Level Share of total Six-month-ended 
annualised change
$ billion Per cent Per cent
Credit risk 1 416 86 2.8
Operational risk 152 9 1.9
Market risk 76 5 –15.7
Total risk-weighted assets 1 644 100 1.7
Source: APRA
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component of RWAs fell, partly due to a decline in 
long-term interest rates. While this component is 
relatively volatile, it represents only 5 per cent of the 
total given the large Australian banks’ businesses are 
mainly focused on commercial banking rather than 
trading activities.
The other component of banks’ RWAs, operational 
risk, has increased as a share of the total over the 
past couple of years. It has recently received greater 
attention among market commentators and the 
global regulatory community following a number 
of conduct-related issues that have resulted in 
significant legal expenses for certain global banks. 
Australian banks have generally been less affected by 
these issues than some banks in other countries, but 
there have still been some operational losses. The 
recent incidents globally highlight the importance 
of a sound operational risk framework that ensures 
the proper functioning and behaviour of systems, 
processes and people.
In addition to risk-based regulatory capital ratios, 
under APRA’s implementation of the Basel III 
international capital framework Australian banks will 
be required to meet non-risk-weighted capital ratios, 
or ‘leverage ratios’, by 2018. The Basel III leverage 
ratio  measures the size of banks’ Tier 1 capital 
base  relative to their total on- and off-balance-sheet 
exposures, with a low ratio indicating a greater 
reliance on non-equity funding. Banks globally, 
including the large Australian banks, will be required 
to begin publicly reporting their Basel  III leverage 
ratios from 1 January 2015 (see ‘Developments in 
the Financial System Architecture’ chapter). The 
specification of the minimum ratio calculation is still 
to be finalised, although based on data provided 
to APRA, the large Australian banks currently meet 
the draft minimum leverage ratio requirement of 
3 per cent.
As discussed in the previous Review, APRA 
designated the four major banks as domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs) and they 
will be required to meet an additional CET1 capital 
requirement equivalent to 1  per cent of their 
RWAs from 1  January  2016. This will increase their 
minimum regulatory CET1 capital ratio to 8 per cent 
from 2016 (compared with 7  per cent for smaller 
banks). The major banks’ capital targets will need to 
be somewhat higher than this to meet any capital 
add-ons that APRA imposes because of their risk 
profile, and to provide a buffer above their minimum 
requirements in case of a temporary negative shock 
to capital. APRA’s recent clarification that wealth 
management non-operating holding companies 
(NOHCs) are to be included in banking groups for 
capital purposes will also add to the major banks’ 
future capital needs; most of the major banks 
have had capital benefits by treating NOHCs as 
‘non-consolidated’ subsidiaries.2 APRA will phase out 
this treatment by 2018.
The major banks are well placed to adjust to these 
higher requirements through earnings retention if 
current profitability persists. However, given their 
overall task and the potential for market scrutiny 
of their progress, the major banks may want to 
build up common equity at a faster pace. Most 
major banks have done so during recent months 
by issuing a modest amount of equity through 
dividend reinvestment plans. Over the past couple 
of years the major banks have generally offset the 
boost to common equity arising from their dividend 
reinvestment plans by purchasing their shares on 
the market.
Shadow banking
As reported in previous Reviews, one of the four main 
international regulatory reform areas since the crisis 
has been to respond to risks from shadow banking, 
broadly defined as credit intermediation involving 
entities and activities outside the prudentially 
regulated banking system. The shadow banking 
sector in Australia is estimated at around 5 per cent 
of financial system assets, with this share declining 
noticeably since the onset of the financial crisis 
(Table  2.3). Given its small size, and limited credit 
2 For further details, see APRA (2014), ‘Composition of a Level 2 
Authorised Deposit-Taking Institution Group’, Letter to Authorised 
Deposit-taking Institutions’, 14 May.
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and funding links to the regulated banking system, 
the shadow banking sector continues to pose 
little systemic risk in Australia. This is in contrast to 
the case in some other countries. Nonetheless, 
the Reserve Bank continues to monitor these 
trends given the potential for bank-like activities to 
migrate to the shadow banking sector, particularly 
as full implementation of the tighter post-crisis 
prudential framework for banks progresses. As part 
of its monitoring efforts, the Reserve Bank provides 
annual updates to the CFR and participates in the 
annual assessment of global developments that is 
conducted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).3
One area of shadow banking activity in Australia 
that warrants particular attention is non-bank 
securitisation activity, given strengthening investor 
risk appetite as well as the connections between this 
3 See Financial Stability Board (2013), ‘Global Shadow Banking 
Monitoring Report 2013’, 14 November.
activity, the housing market and the banking system 
(through the various support facilities provided by 
banks). As discussed, RMBS issuance has picked up 
since 2013 and spreads have narrowed, including 
for non-bank issuers (i.e. mortgage originators). 
Mortgage originators tend to have riskier loan pools 
than banks; this is partly because they are the only 
suppliers of non-conforming residential mortgages, 
which are typically made to borrowers who do not 
meet the standard underwriting criteria of banks. 
These originators currently account for about 2 per 
cent of the Australian mortgage market (not all 
of which is non-conforming), and so have limited 
influence on competition in the mortgage market 
and the housing price cycle. Even so, it is useful to 
monitor any signs of greater non-bank activity, as 
this could signal a broader pick-up in risk appetite 
for housing.
Table 2.3: Financial Sector Composition by Entity Type(a)
Share of financial system assets, as at December
2007 2013
Per cent Per cent
Banks, credit unions and building societies 52 55
Superannuation funds(b) 24 27
Insurers 3 3
Total prudentially regulated 79 85
Structured finance vehicles 6 6
Other investment funds 9 5
Finance companies 3 2
Money market corporations 2 1
Cash management trusts 1 0
Total non-prudentially regulated 21 15
Less:
  – Self-securitisation 0 4
  – Real estate investment funds 4 3
  – Equity funds 4 2
  – Prudentially consolidated assets(c) 3 1
Shadow banking sector estimate 10 5
(a) Excludes central bank
(b) Includes self-managed superannuation funds which are regulated by the Australian Taxation Office
(c) Assets that are consolidated as part of the prudentially consolidated banking group
Sources: ABS; APRA; RBA
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managed Funds
Consolidated assets held by domestic funds 
management institutions continued to grow at a 
strong, albeit slower, pace over the six months to 
June 2014 (Table  2.4). Growth in superannuation 
funds’ assets, which make up around three-quarters 
of total managed funds’ assets, was somewhat slower 
than in 2013. Superannuation funds’ net investment 
income was softer, largely attributable to broadly flat 
domestic equity market prices and valuation effects 
on overseas assets from the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar during the period.
As part of the Government’s superannuation safety 
reforms, APRA released a suite of prudential and 
reporting standards for the superannuation industry 
over 2012 and 2013 relating to, among other 
things, risk management and governance. From 
the beginning of 2014, all default superannuation 
contributions were required to be paid into MySuper 
products, which are offered by APRA-authorised 
providers that satisfy certain requirements regarding 
investment strategy, fees, and governance.4 In light 
of these reforms, APRA will be closely monitoring 
4 See APRA (2014), ‘MySuper Authorisation’, APRA Insight, Issue One, 
pp 30–56. 
compliance with MySuper requirements, including 
operational risk requirements. Over the medium 
term, the availability of a low-cost default option 
may have implications for the asset allocation of 
the superannuation industry and linkages with the 
banking sector more broadly, although the precise 
shape of such changes is difficult to predict. Any 
changes would be in addition to the structural 
changes already occurring as a result of the rise in 
self-managed superannuation funds.
Insurance
The general insurance industry is well capitalised, 
with its capital equivalent to 1.9  times APRA’s 
prescribed amount. General insurers’ profitability is 
also strong – the industry recorded an annualised 
return on equity of 17  per cent in the first half of 
2014 (Graph 2.17). The aggregate underwriting result 
remained robust, mainly reflecting a favourable 
outcome for claims expenses. Natural catastrophe 
claims in 2014 to date are at their lowest levels in a 
couple of decades, with no substantial claims events 
recorded as yet (Graph  2.18). Insurers’ investment 
Table 2.4: Assets of Domestic Funds Management Institutions
As at June 2014
Level Share of total Six-month-ended annualised 
change
Dec 2013 Jun 2014
$ billion Per cent Per cent Per cent
Superannuation funds 1 745 74 19.2 6.0
Life insurers(a) 281 12 14.9 5.4
Public unit trusts 294 12 2.9 1.7
Other managed funds(b) 36 2 –12.8 –2.7
Total (unconsolidated) 2 356 100 15.8 5.2
of which:
Cross investments 461 – 19.9 –5.5
Total (consolidated) 1 895 – 14.8 8.1
(a) Includes superannuation funds held in the statutory funds of life insurers
(b) Cash management trusts, common funds and friendly societies
Sources: ABS; RBA
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income also increased in the latest period due to 
tighter credit spreads on benchmark fixed-income 
securities.
Insurers’ profitability in the past couple of years 
has also been supported by rises in premium 
rates on some business lines (particularly home 
insurance) following natural catastrophes in 2010 
and 2011. However, insurers report that strong 
price competition has emerged this year for ‘short 
tail’ classes of insurance, such as home and motor 
vehicle, with the outlook for associated premium 
rates therefore weaker than in previous years. This 
has been mainly attributed to the entry of some 
lower-cost brands to the general insurance market. 
An emerging challenge for the general insurance 
industry has been the growth of ‘aggregator’ 
or price  comparison websites. Although these 
websites can provide a valuable comparison tool 
for consumers and promote competition, some 
insurers have raised concerns that the focus on 
price (as opposed to other product features) could 
lead to consumers making uninformed choices 
and placing themselves at risk of underinsurance. 
More generally, given these developments, there is 
also the potential for insurers to under price risk in 
order to remain competitive, which could adversely 
impact insurers’ overall future profitability.
Lenders mortgage insurers (LMIs) are specialist 
general insurers that offer protection to banks and 
other lenders against losses on defaulted mortgages, 
in return for an insurance premium. LMIs’ profitability 
improved in the first half of 2014, with the industry 
posting a return on equity of about 14  per cent, 
up from an average of around 10  per cent over 
the preceding few years. The number and average 
value of claims on LMIs has declined recently in 
response to the buoyant housing market, as well as 
previous improvements in underwriting standards. 
In addition, some LMIs have recently increased their 
premium rates. In May, the largest LMI, Genworth 
Australia, successfully listed on the ASX, with around 
one-third of the company now independently 
owned. Also, in August QBE announced plans to 
partially float its subsidiary, which is the other major 
LMI in Australia. Share market listing will subject the 
relatively concentrated Australian LMI industry to 
greater market scrutiny and increase its access to 
domestic capital markets; such developments could 
be beneficial to financial stability given the LMI 
industry’s involvement in the credit creation process 
and linkages to the banking system.
Life insurers’ profit increased in the first half of 2014 
following a sharp decline in 2013 (Graph  2.19). 
The increase was partly due to a better result for 
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superannuation ‘group’ life insurance business, 
which has been facing a challenging operating 
environment in recent years. As discussed in the 
previous Review, excessive competition for group 
life insurance policies led to an under-pricing of 
risk and subsequent losses. Some life insurers 
have responded by increasing premium rates 
recently on group policies. APRA is liaising closely 
with both life insurers and superannuation fund 
trustees to address sustainability issues in this line of 
business, particularly with regards to policy design, 
underwriting standards, claims management and 
data quality.5 More broadly, the profitability of the 
life insurance industry has also been weighed upon 
by high policy lapse rates, as well as changes in 
social attitudes to insurance, which have increased 
the propensity of policyholders to make claims and 
for a broader range of reasons (for example, mental 
illnesses). Despite the difficult conditions, the life 
insurance industry’s capital position is sound, at 
1.9 times APRA’s prescribed capital amount.
Financial market Infrastructure
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs), such as 
payments systems, central counterparties (CCPs) 
and securities settlements systems, facilitate most 
5 For further discussion, see Rowell (2014), ‘APRA’s Expectations of 
Superannuation Fund Trustees’, Speech to ASFA Unpacks: The Future 
of Insurance in Superannuation, Sydney, 29 April.
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Graph 2.19 financial market transactions in the economy.6 FMIs 
can, if well-designed, contribute to the efficiency and 
stability of the financial system. But they can also be a 
source of risk because of their size, strong connections 
with banks and other financial institutions, and the 
lack of substitutes for the services that they provide. 
The resilience and risk management practices of 
FMIs are therefore important for financial stability. 
This is increasingly so given global regulatory 
reforms are driving the increased use of centralised 
infrastructure, such as CCPs.
Reserve bank Information and 
transfer System
The Reserve Bank owns and operates Australia’s 
real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, the 
Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System (RITS), 
through which most Australian dollar-denominated 
interbank payments are settled. RITS continued to 
operate smoothly over the past six months, settling 
around five million payments worth $20 trillion.
The Reserve Bank invests in regular upgrades to 
its systems to ensure that RITS maintains resilient 
operations. An upgrade of core infrastructure 
was completed in the six months to June 2014, 
including the replacement of operating systems 
and databases, while system monitoring capabilities 
were enhanced. The Reserve Bank also invests in 
developing new functionality in RITS to help meet 
the changing needs of the payments system. One 
such piece of work nearing completion will settle 
the interbank cash settlement leg of property 
transactions, as part of a national electronic 
conveyancing system. The new system is intended 
to remove the manual processes and paperwork 
associated with property transactions, thereby 
delivering efficiency gains and cost savings to 
consumers and industry participants. Enhancement 
to RITS functionality to support settlement of these 
transactions will be implemented in late 2014.
6 A full list of FMIs operating in Australia, as well as indicators of their 
systemic importance, is available in RBA (2014), Submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, March, pp 91–92.
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Interbank obligations arising from low-value 
payments, such as cheques, direct entry, and 
consumer electronic (card-based) transactions, settle 
in RITS on a multilaterally netted basis, rather than on 
an RTGS basis. Over the past six months, the average 
daily gross value of these obligations accounted 
for around 9 per cent of total daily payments 
settled in RITS. Cheques and consumer electronic 
obligations are settled at 9.00 am on the business 
day following their exchange. Since November 2013, 
most non-government direct entry obligations have 
been settled on a same-day basis in five intraday 
multilateral net batches, at 10.45 am, 1.45 pm, 
4.45  pm, 7.15 pm and 9.15 pm.7 This has allowed 
direct entry transactions to be finalised in a more 
timely fashion, and reduced the credit exposure that 
can arise when payments are posted to customer 
accounts ahead of interbank settlement. 
Same-day settlement of interbank direct entry 
obligations has also resulted in a significant increase 
in the average daily multilateral net settlement 
value because the direct entry obligations are now 
separated into five daily settlements, which are no 
longer being netted against other low-value payments. 
Prior to November 2013, the net average daily value 
of the 9.00  am settlement was $4  billion, whereas 
subsequently around $7  billion in net multilateral 
settlements have been settled each day (Graph 2.20).
To facilitate the same-day settlement of direct entry 
obligations, the Reserve Bank introduced new liquidity 
arrangements in RITS, whereby the Reserve Bank 
makes Exchange Settlement Account (ESA) funds 
available to participants via repurchase agreements 
(repos) with an open-ended repurchase date. These 
open repos allow participants to meet the funding 
requirements of the two ‘late’ (7.15 pm and 9.15 pm) 
multilateral settlements that settle outside of normal 
banking hours. As a result, total system liquidity 
increased significantly in November 2013 and has 
remained at these elevated levels since (Graph 2.21). 
7 For further details on the implementation of same-day settlement 
of direct entry obligations, see Fraser S and A Gatty (2014), ‘The 
Introduction of Same-day Settlement of Direct Entry Obligations in 
Australia’, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, June, pp 55–64.
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The additional system liquidity has contributed to 
shorter queue times for RTGS payments, on average, 
as well as earlier settlement of payments in the day.
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Developments in CCp risk management
CCPs provide centralised management of 
counterparty risk to their participants. In Australia 
there are three licensed CCPs:
 • ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures) are both 
owned by the ASX Group (ASX) and clear trades 
from ASX’s equities and derivatives markets, 
and the over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate 
derivatives market
 • LCH.Clearnet Limited (LCH.C Ltd) is licensed in 
Australia to clear OTC interest rate derivatives 
and certain financial products that are to be 
traded on a soon-to-launch derivatives market, 
the Financial and Energy Exchange.
Given their importance to the financial system, CCPs 
licensed to operate in Australia must meet Financial 
Stability Standards (FSS) determined by the Reserve 
Bank. The FSS were adjusted in early 2013 to align 
with new international standards, the Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures (see ‘Developments in 
the Financial System Architecture’ chapter). Amongst 
other changes, the revised FSS introduced more 
detailed requirements for the validation of CCP risk 
models. These include the assessment of model 
performance against historical data, analysis of the 
sensitivity of models to key assumptions, and periodic 
independent reviews of the modelling approach. 
Consequently, during 2013/14, a major focus of the 
Bank’s oversight of ASX’s CCPs has been on how the 
CCPs validate the performance of their risk models. 
CCPs use risk models to estimate their potential 
credit and liquidity exposures in both normal and 
stressed market conditions. For example, in order 
to assess the adequacy of their financial resources, 
ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures) each perform daily 
capital stress tests that compare available prefunded 
resources against the largest potential loss in the 
event of the default of a participant (Graph 2.22). The 
CCPs also maintain models to ensure that the value 
of collateral they receive from participants to cover 
these exposures can be relied upon, even in stressed 
market conditions.
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The ASX CCPs have made significant progress in 
implementing enhancements to all areas of their 
model validation framework. The Reserve Bank found 
in its 2013/14 Assessment of the ASX CCPs that they 
now observe the majority of the model validation 
requirements in the FSS. Overall, the Assessment 
concluded that the ASX CCPs had either observed 
or broadly observed the full range of relevant 
requirements under the FSS, while making a number 
of recommendations to strengthen further the 
CCPs’ observance of these requirements.8 Other key 
matters covered in the report included initial work by 
the CCPs to plan for recovery from an extreme event 
that threatened their ongoing provision of clearing 
services, and ASX’s risk management arrangements 
for its investment portfolio.
8 For further details, see RBA (2014), ‘2013/14 Assessment of 
ASX Clearing and Settlement Facilities’, September.
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The Bank has also recently released its first 
assessment of LCH.C Ltd against the FSS, covering 
the financial year 2013/14.9 This period was a time 
of transition for LCH.C Ltd, during which it admitted 
its first Australian participants. The tailoring of 
LCH.C Ltd’s services to Australian participants has 
been a focus of the Reserve Bank’s oversight of 
LCH.C Ltd. During the period, LCH.C Ltd introduced 
a formal structure to facilitate the input of 
Australian participants into its governance and risk 
management. It has also applied to the Reserve 
Bank to open an Exchange Settlement Account, and 
intends to extend the operating hours of its OTC 
interest rate derivatives clearing service to cater for 
the Australian time zone.
Use of CCps for clearing OtC derivatives
The volume and value of OTC interest rate 
derivatives that are centrally cleared by Australian 
banks has continued to rise; the value of banks’ 
interest-rate derivatives cleared at LCH.C Ltd, which 
clears the majority of banks’ activity in this market, 
rose from 19  per  cent to 27  per cent of the total 
notional principal outstanding over the six months 
to June 2014 (Graph 2.23). This increase has occurred 
even though a mandatory clearing requirement for 
interest rate derivatives has not yet come into effect in 
9 For further details, see RBA (2014), ‘2013/14 Assessment of 
LCH.Clearnet Limited’s SwapClear Service’, September.
Australia (see  ‘Developments in the Financial System 
Architecture’ chapter). This at least partly reflects that 
mandatory central clearing requirements are already 
in place in certain overseas markets and banks are 
anticipating the introduction of additional mandates 
both domestically and overseas. In addition, there 
are commercial incentives to move to the centrally 
cleared market. In particular, with most interest rate 
derivatives trades between large internationally 
active dealers being centrally cleared, liquidity and 
pricing are generally more favourable for centrally 
cleared trades. This has been driven, in part, by 
dealers seeking to maximise operational and netting 
efficiencies, and minimise capital requirements.
The two CCPs licensed in Australia to clear OTC 
interest rate derivatives – ASX Clear (Futures) and 
LCH.C Ltd – continue to accept Australian banks as 
direct participants. Four of the large domestic banks 
have joined ASX Clear (Futures) as direct participants 
and three have joined LCH.C Ltd, although some 
additional participants are expected in the near 
future. A number of domestic banks also continue to 
clear OTC interest rate derivatives indirectly – that is, 
using a ‘client’ clearing arrangement with a clearing 
agent that is a direct clearing participant – through 
LCH.C Ltd and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Although central clearing among smaller financial 
institutions and non-financial corporations 
(collectively referred to as non-dealers) is currently 
limited, a small number of large non-dealers have 
client clearing arrangements in place. Central 
clearing by non-dealers is most common in products 
that are subject to foreign mandatory clearing 
requirements.
Both ASX Clear (Futures) and LCH.C Ltd’s services 
allow non-dealers that clear indirectly the option 
to segregate their positions and collateral from 
both their clearing agent and other clients of their 
clearing agent. This allows non-dealers to better 
manage the risks they face from clearing indirectly, 
and increases the likelihood that, in the event of the 
default of their clearing agent, their positions and 
associated collateral could be transferred (‘ported’) 
to an alternative clearing participant.  R
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Box B
Australian Major Banks’ Cost-to-income Ratios
Improvement in operational efficiency is one factor 
underlying the strong profitability of the four major 
Australian banks over the past couple of decades. 
Operational efficiency in banking is commonly 
proxied by the cost-to-income (CI) ratio – that is, 
the ratio of total operating costs (excluding bad and 
doubtful debt charges) to total income (the sum of 
net interest and non-interest income). The major 
banks’ aggregate CI  ratio has fallen by just under 
20  percentage points since the mid 1990s, to be 
44 per cent in the 2013 financial year (Graph B1).1
The Australian major banks’ CI ratios have been 
at the bottom end of the range of their peers 
internationally in recent years, contributing to 
their relatively higher profitability (see Graph 1.8 in 
the ‘The Global Financial Environment’ chapter).2 
Reported CI ratios vary widely across a sample of 
1 This has been an offset to the decline in the major banks’ net interest 
margin over this period.
2 For example, the Australian major banks were ranked as the most 
profitable among their advanced economy peers in the 2012/13 and 
2013/14 Annual Reports of the Bank for International Settlements.
52 large international banks (Graph B2). Hong Kong 
banks recorded the lowest CI ratios in 2013 at 32 per 
cent, followed by New Zealand, Australian and 
Swedish banks, which had CI ratios below 50  per 
cent. Given the New Zealand banks are subsidiaries 
of the Australian major banks, it is not surprising that 
their CI ratios were similar to those of their Australian 
parents.3 In contrast, CI ratios for large banks in 
Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom 
were relatively high in 2013, at above 70  per cent. 
The most notable change compared with 2007, just 
prior to the financial crisis, is that some German and 
United Kingdom banks’ CI ratios were significantly 
higher in 2013, reflecting large declines in income. 
CI ratios were broadly unchanged over this time 
in those banking systems with the lowest CI ratios, 
including Australia.
Banks’ CI ratios can be decomposed into various 
categories of operating costs: personnel, occupancy, 
information technology (IT) and ‘other’ costs (which 
include expenses such as fees and commissions, 
marketing and litigation) (Graph B3). Personnel and 
‘other’ costs are the largest components of banks’ 
total costs and, as such, are important drivers of 
CI  ratios. Those banks which reported the lowest 
CI ratios in the sample also had the lowest personnel 
and ‘other’ costs-to-income. Most European banks, 
in particular Swiss banks, reported relatively high 
personnel and ‘other’ costs-to-income. There is less 
variation in occupancy and IT costs-to-income across 
banks, although it is notable that the Australian 
major banks recorded among the lowest occupancy 
costs-to-income in 2013. 
3 The New Zealand subsidiaries have similar business models to their 
Australian parents and are likely to have benefited from similar 
efficiency improvements. Nonetheless, the New Zealand subsidiaries 
have been included separately because the cost structure in the New 
Zealand economy could differ from that in Australia.
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during the 1990s.4 The major Australian banks have 
renewed their focus on costs in the past few years to 
help counteract the effect of more moderate balance 
sheet growth on their profitability. Specifically, they 
have undertaken a range of initiatives including 
restructuring operations, upgrading their core 
4 See Stewart C, B Robertson and A Heath (2013), ‘Trends in the Funding 
and Lending Behaviour of Australian Banks’, RBA Research Discussion 
Paper No 2013-15.
The decline in the Australian major banks’ aggregate 
CI ratio over the past two decades reflects a number 
of factors. By adopting new technologies, banks have 
been able to provide more streamlined banking 
services to customers and improve back-office 
processes such as loan approvals, and information 
processing and management. Additionally, a 
focus on reducing high-cost, low-value operations 
resulted in the closure of a large number of branches 
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banking systems, and outsourcing back-office 
processing and support operations to lower cost 
locations offshore. In addition, the major banks 
have moved towards branch operating models that 
focus on product sales and cross-selling, as opposed 
to traditional transactional banking activities that 
are being done increasingly through internet and 
mobile facilities.
The Australian major banks’ focus on commercial 
banking – that is, lending to households and 
businesses – appears to be a contributor to their 
relatively low CI ratio. In 2013, those large banks 
that earned a greater share of their income from 
net interest income (a proxy for a bank’s focus on 
lending activities) tended to have lower CI ratios 
than ‘universal’ banks, which earned a larger share 
of their income through non-interest sources such 
as investment banking or wealth management 
(Graph B4).5 One possible reason for this relationship 
is that universal banks tend to pay higher levels of staff 
remuneration, on average. This is consistent with the 
pattern in Graph B3 which shows that many of the 
5 While some universal banks’ CI ratios have been higher in recent years 
due to large declines in trading income following the global financial 
crisis, the relationship between banks’ business models and CI ratios 
still broadly held in 2007.
Graph B4
Graph B5
Large Banks’ Personnel Cost Premium*
* Large banks’ average personnel cost per employee in their consolidated global operations
relative to average wage in home economy; data for Hong Kong and New Zealand not
available; reduced sample for France and Japan due to data availability
Sources: OECD; RBA; SNL Financial
times
Australia
Spain
Sweden
Japan
Canada
Italy
France
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
Switzerland
0 1 2 3
2012
large European banks – which typically earn a higher 
share of income from investment banking and wealth 
management activities – have higher personnel 
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Australian major banks’ relatively low CI ratio, even 
compared with some other commercial banks, is 
that residential mortgage lending represents a high 
share of their total lending; as housing mortgages 
are more homogenous than business loans, the cost 
of distributing them is likely to have benefited more 
from technological advances than business lending 
or relationship-based financial services. 
The above analysis suggests that there may be 
diseconomies of scope for some large banks – that 
is, average costs increase as they diversify outside of 
commercial banking services. This is consistent with 
some literature which points to negative returns 
to scope when banks move into market-based 
activities.6 While market-based activities can provide 
a more diversified revenue stream for banks, they are 
typically a more volatile source of income and can 
expose banks to additional risks and complexity. 
Interestingly, the Bank for International Settlements 
noted in its 2013/14 Annual Report that in the post-
crisis period, a number of large international banks 
with significant trading businesses have adjusted 
their business models away from those activities 
somewhat, consistent with the better performance 
and efficiency of banks with a more commercial 
banking model.
6 See Laeven L, L Ratnovski and H Tong (2014), ‘Bank Size and Systemic 
Risk’, IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/04 (and references within). As 
summarised in this paper, the source of negative returns to scope in 
the literature is the agency costs associated with monitoring complex 
financial conglomerates, which can result in lower market valuations, 
higher systemic risk and lower risk-adjusted returns.
The Australian major banks’ CI ratios are also well 
below those for smaller banks in Australia; for 
example, in 2013 the regional banks’ aggregate 
CI ratio was 57  per cent, compared with 44  per 
cent for the major banks (Graph B6). Given that 
the major banks and regional banks have similar 
(commercial banking) business models and are likely 
to face a similar operating cost base, economies of 
scale could be one factor explaining the difference 
between their CI ratios. For example, the major banks 
may have been able to achieve efficiencies through 
spreading the fixed component of their operating 
costs over a larger revenue or asset base.7  R 
7 While early literature found economies of scale in banking to be 
limited to relatively small banks, more recent academic studies have 
found evidence of scale economies in large banks. See Kovner A, 
J  Vickery and L Zhou (2014), ‘Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating 
Costs?’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 
20(2), pp 1–27 (and references within).  
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3.  Household and business  
Finances
The pick-up in household risk appetite that was 
evident six months ago appears to have continued, 
as has the associated willingness to take on some 
types of debt. Housing prices have been rising 
strongly in the larger cities. To some extent, these 
outcomes are to be expected given the low 
interest rate environment and the search for yield 
behaviour of investors more generally, both here 
and overseas. However, the composition of housing 
and mortgage markets is becoming unbalanced. 
This has been most evident in the current strength 
of investor activity in the housing market, and in 
its concentration in Sydney and Melbourne. The 
apparent increase in the use of interest-only loans 
by both owner-occupiers and investors might also 
be consistent with increasingly speculative motives 
behind current housing demand.
At this stage, the main risk from this strong investor 
activity appears to be that the extra demand may 
exacerbate the housing price cycle and increase 
the potential for prices to fall later. The risks from 
the consequent declines in household wealth 
and spending are likely to be macroeconomic, 
rather than direct risks to the stability of financial 
institutions. In other respects, some households 
have continued to foster sustainable financial 
positions by taking advantage of lower interest rates 
to pay down debt. Although the household saving 
rate has drifted down a little, it remains much higher 
than in recent decades. 
Near-term risks from the non-financial business 
sector appear to be low, with a possible exception 
of the commercial property sector, where strong 
demand from domestic and foreign investors has 
meant the divergence between rising prices and 
soft leasing conditions has persisted. With attractive 
yields on Australian commercial property, many 
of the dynamics evident in investor housing are 
also playing out in this market, increasing the 
vulnerability of the commercial property market 
to a price correction. More broadly, business 
conditions remain around long-run average levels 
and corporate balance sheets appear generally to be 
in good shape, with gearing low and the ability to 
service debt fairly high. For businesses outside the 
property sector, there is moderate appetite for taking 
on debt for investment purposes, despite ready 
access to credit. At this stage, lending standards have 
been little changed overall and the performance of 
existing business loans has continued to improve.
Household Sector
borrowing and balance sheet position
Households’ appetite for risk has continued to 
increase over 2014. This trend has been evident for 
the past year or so and is to some extent an expected 
reaction to low interest rates; housing price inflation 
and, more recently, competition amongst lenders on 
price have also played a role. Accordingly, household 
credit growth has picked up, almost entirely driven 
by investor housing credit, which is growing at its 
fastest pace since late 2007 (Graph 3.1).
The willingness of some households to take on more 
debt, combined with slower growth in incomes, 
means that the debt-to-income ratio has picked 
40 ReseRve bank of austRalia
up a little in the past six months. While this ratio 
is still within its range of the past eight years at 
around 150 per cent, it is historically high and hence 
any further increases in household indebtedness 
would be taking place from an already high base 
(Graph 3.2). Households’ ability to service their debt 
has been aided by ongoing low interest rates. The 
proportion of disposable income required to meet 
interest payments on household debt has stabilised 
accordingly, at around 9 per cent.
Graph 3.2
Households continue to take advantage of lower 
interest rates to pay down their mortgages more 
quickly than required. The aggregate mortgage 
buffer – balances in mortgage offset and redraw 
facilities – has risen to be around 15  per cent of 
outstanding balances, which is equivalent to more 
than two years of scheduled repayments at current 
interest rates. Prepayment rates and the proportion 
of borrowers ahead of schedule on their mortgage 
repayments are also high according to liaison with 
banks. Part of this prepayment behaviour has been 
due to some banks’ systems not automatically 
changing customer repayment amounts as 
interest rates have declined, while in many cases 
households have not actively sought to reduce their 
repayments. This might be a sign that household 
stress is currently limited. The household saving ratio, 
although trending down a little lately, remains high 
at just under 10  per cent. Households’ aggregate 
balance sheet position has continued to improve 
in recent quarters: real net worth per household is 
estimated to have increased by 4 per cent over the 
year to September 2014. 
Outside of property investment, households have 
also shown some appetite for risk in their financial 
investments. As discussed in ‘The Australian Financial 
System’ chapter, retail investors have been attracted 
to the relatively high yields on non-common-equity 
instruments issued by banks (often referred to as 
‘hybrids’). These instruments are complex in nature 
and feature elements of both debt and equity. The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
has in the past issued public warnings about the 
risks involved in holding hybrid instruments and, as 
with any complex instrument, households should 
understand and take into account the associated 
financial risks. 
Housing market activity
The increase in household risk appetite is most 
evident in the continued strength of investor activity 
in the housing market. The momentum in investor 
housing activity has been concentrated in Sydney 
Graph 3.1
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Graph 3.3
Graph 3.4and (to a lesser extent) Melbourne: investor housing 
loan approvals are almost 90 per cent higher in New 
South Wales than they were two years ago and are 
50 per cent higher over the same period in Victoria 
(Graph  3.3). As a share of approvals, both are back 
around previous peaks. By contrast, the momentum 
in the owner-occupier market appears to have 
slowed over the past six months or so, with loan 
approvals to owner-occupiers little changed. Some 
potential first home buyers are likely to have been 
priced out of parts of the market by investors, who 
typically have higher incomes and are therefore 
able to bid up prices. The broad-based reduction in 
grants to first home buyers for established housing 
since late 2012 has also contributed to reduced 
demand from these buyers. 
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Strong investor demand can be a sign of speculative 
excess, with the risk that additional speculative 
demand can amplify the cycle in housing prices and 
increase the potential for prices to fall later. This is 
particularly the case if that demand is largely based 
on unrealistic expectations of future price growth, 
perhaps extrapolated from recent experience. 
A Mortgage Choice survey shows a positive 
relationship between the share of households 
expecting further housing price inflation and the 
rate of price inflation in the current year; that is, 
expectations of future housing prices seem to 
be influenced by the recent past (Graph  3.4). This 
tendency was stronger than average in New South 
Wales and Victoria at the end of last year. The risks 
associated with this behaviour are likely to be 
macroeconomic in nature if households were to 
react to declines in their wealth and any repayment 
difficulties by cutting back their spending. 
A speculative upswing in demand can also 
be damaging if it brings forth an increase in 
construction on a scale that leads to a future 
overhang of supply. This risk is more likely to arise 
in particular local markets than at the national level. 
Nationally, Australia is a long way from an oversupply 
of housing and some increase in supply is to be 
expected in response to higher prices, which should 
also help to temper those rising prices.
 • The pick-up in housing prices and investor 
lending has been most pronounced in Sydney 
(Graph  3.5). Construction of new dwellings has 
also recovered over the past two years, but this 
follows a reasonably long period of limited new 
supply. In addition, the pick-up in construction 
has been spread geographically in both the inner 
and middle areas of Sydney, and has also been for 
both higher-density (apartments) and detached 
dwellings. These factors reduce the risk that 
pockets of oversupply in particular regions or of a 
particular dwelling type will emerge.
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 • The risk of localised oversupply seems somewhat 
higher in Melbourne where there has been 
greater geographic concentration of building 
activity recently. Apartment construction in 
the inner city has been at high levels for some 
time and, given the time lags in completing 
higher density constructions, is expected to 
remain elevated for the next few years. That said, 
liaison suggests that construction in Melbourne 
continues to be driven by strong demand, 
including from foreign investors, with pre-sale 
levels remaining high.
 • A related risk, which is likely to be currently 
most pronounced in Melbourne, is that some 
new developments may appeal to a relatively 
narrow segment of tenant or owner demand. 
For example, some new developments involve 
smaller-sized apartments that are targeted at 
international students, which could be harder 
to sell in the secondary market than more 
traditional-sized apartments. This could place 
downward pressure on apartment prices if 
student demand weakens or if there are other 
shocks that reduce foreign investors’ appetite for 
these apartments. 
Despite the activity and housing price inflation in 
the Sydney and Melbourne property markets, rental 
yields have not declined to a significant extent 
and vacancy rates in these cities remain fairly low 
(Graph 3.6). However, rental yields may come under 
pressure if the momentum in housing price inflation 
continues. Households should therefore be mindful 
of the risks when making investment property 
decisions in these conditions (for discussion of 
the financial position of investor households, see 
‘Box C: Households’ Investment Property Exposures: 
Evidence from Tax and Survey Data’).
Graph 3.5
Graph 3.6
Housing loan characteristics
In an environment of historically low interest rates, 
rising housing prices and strong price competition 
in the mortgage market, there is some risk that 
households may attempt to take out loans that 
they would not be able to service comfortably if 
interest rates were to rise. Lenders’ credit decisions 
and policies should be, and in Australia generally are, 
designed to prevent this. As discussed in the chapter 
‘The Australian Financial System’, to help mitigate 
this risk further, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority’s (APRA) draft Prudential Practice Guide on 
mortgage lending emphasises that banks should 
apply an interest rate add-on to the mortgage rate, in 
conjunction with an interest rate ‘floor’, in assessing a 
borrower’s capacity to service their loan. The lending 
behaviour of banks in this environment, including 
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their adherence to prudent practices like the use 
of add-ons and floors in assessing serviceability, is 
particularly important; it is no surprise that APRA 
is keeping a close watch on this. So far, it appears 
that banks’ lending standards have been holding 
fairly steady overall; while some elements or market 
segments have eased a little, others have tightened 
up a bit (Graph 3.7).
 • The share of loan approvals with loan-to-
valuation ratios (LVRs) over 90  per cent has 
trended down since early 2013 for both 
owner-occupiers and investors, though some 
of this seems to have shifted into the group of 
approvals with LVRs between 80 and 90 per cent.
 • Some institutions appear to be lending at high 
loan-to-income ratios and, overall, the average 
size of new loans has risen recently. Importantly 
from a household risk perspective, only a small 
share of new lending currently appears to have 
both a high LVR and a high loan-to-income 
ratio, which implies that few households are 
simultaneously exposed to the risks of falling 
into negative equity and facing difficulty making 
their loan repayments. Any increase from the 
current small share of new lending with both a 
high LVR and high loan-to-income ratio would, 
however, be undesirable and this configuration 
of lending continues to be closely monitored.
Another feature worthy of close monitoring is 
the aggregate interest-only share of banks’ new 
lending, which has continued to increase for both 
investors and owner-occupiers in 2014. This might 
be indicative of speculative demand motivating a 
rising share of housing purchases. Consistent with 
mortgage interest payments being tax-deductible 
for investors, the interest-only share of approvals 
to investors remains substantially higher than to 
owner-occupiers. According to liaison with banks, 
the trend in interest-only owner-occupier borrowing 
has been largely because these loans provide 
increased flexibility to the borrower. It does not 
necessarily mean that borrowers are taking on debt 
that they may not be able to service if both interest 
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and principal repayments are made. Rather, some of 
these borrowers are likely to be building up buffers 
in offset accounts. 
In any case, APRA’s draft Prudential Practice Guide 
emphasises that a prudent authorised deposit-
taking institution would assess customers’ ability to 
service principal and interest payments following 
the expiry of the interest-only period. More broadly, 
consumer protection regulations require that lenders 
do not provide credit products and services that are 
unsuitable because, for example, the consumer does 
not have the capacity to meet the repayments.
Loan performance and other indicators  
of household financial stress
Aggregate indicators suggest that household 
financial stress is generally low, despite the increase in 
the unemployment rate over the past year. The share 
of banks’ housing loans that are non-performing has 
declined for both owner-occupiers and investors 
since reaching a peak in the middle of 2011. Data 
on securitised housing loans show that the share 
that are 90  days or more past due has declined 
over the year for most states, coinciding with lower 
interest rates and rising housing prices (Graph 3.8). In 
Victoria, however, loan performance has deteriorated 
slightly, particularly in those geographic regions 
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such as outer-west and north Melbourne where 
unemployment rates have either increased recently 
or are at elevated levels. The large volume of supply 
coming online in the Melbourne inner-city apartment 
market increases the risk of further deterioration in 
loan performance in Victoria. More generally, future 
housing loan performance is likely to at least partly 
depend on labour market performance. Although 
forward-looking indicators of labour demand have 
generally improved since last year, they remain 
consistent with only moderate employment growth 
in the near term. 
Other indicators also point to fairly low levels of stress 
in the household sector. Applications for property 
possessions as a share of the dwelling stock have 
trended down since 2011 in the states for which 
data are available (New South Wales, Queensland, 
Victoria and Western Australia) and are currently at 
their lowest levels in more than seven years. The 
non-performance rates on banks’ credit card and 
other personal lending, which are inherently riskier 
and less likely to be secured than housing loans, 
have been little changed in recent quarters. These 
loans remain a small share of total household credit.
Commercial property
The commercial property sector is especially 
important from a financial stability perspective, 
given that it accounts for almost 30 per cent of banks’ 
domestic non-financial business lending. Historically, 
the sector has also comprised a disproportionately 
large share of banks’ non-performing loans. Many of 
the dynamics discussed for the housing market are 
also relevant in the commercial property market, 
in part due to the role of residential property 
development in the sector. The attractive yields on 
Australian commercial property relative to returns 
overseas and on other asset classes have also added 
to these dynamics.
In particular, in the global environment of low 
interest rates and the consequent search for yield, 
the high yield on Australian commercial property 
has attracted strong investor demand, with a 
sharp increase in the total value of office, retail and 
industrial property transactions over the past two 
years (Graph 3.9). This demand has come from both 
domestic and foreign investors; the flow of foreign 
capital into the sector increased strongly over 
the past year.1 Foreign capital is also flowing into 
residential property development, particularly in the 
inner-city Melbourne apartment market.  
The strong demand for commercial property 
continues to boost prices, especially for CBD office 
and industrial properties, despite weak leasing 
conditions and subdued tenant demand in some 
states (Graph 3.10). In particular, lower demand from 
government organisations in Brisbane and mining-
related companies in Brisbane and Perth has weighed 
on conditions in these CBD office markets. By 
contrast, the Sydney office market, where price rises 
have been greatest, has been somewhat shielded 
from the effects of weaker tenant demand, in part 
because withdrawals of property from the market 
(particularly the conversion of older office space to 
residential property) have constrained supply. 
A substantial supply of office properties is under 
construction or being refurbished and is therefore 
expected to come online in the next couple of 
1 For further detail on foreign investment in the commercial property 
market, see Lane K, A Sinclair and D Orsmond (2014), ‘Foreign 
Investment in Australian Commercial Property’, RBA Bulletin, 
September, pp 21–26.
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Graph 3.9
Graph 3.11
repricing. In particular, inflows of foreign capital 
could slow or cease once global interest rates start 
to rise or if conditions were to weaken in foreign 
investors’ home countries. The risk may also be 
exacerbated by further weakness in commercial 
property leasing conditions.
Another risk facing commercial property lending, 
especially lending for new property development, is 
tenancy risk – that is, the risk that the developer fails 
to secure tenants for their property and consequently 
struggles to meet their loan repayments. This 
risk is higher for developments with a lower 
precommitment rate. For office property, the strength 
in investment demand and relative weakness in 
tenant demand have contributed to a decline in the 
average precommitment rate (Graph  3.11), though 
available data for selected years from the early 1990s 
suggest it remains significantly higher now than it 
was in the lead-up to the severe market downturn 
in the early 1990s. By contrast, pre-sales currently 
remain high for residential property. 
At this stage, the direct risk to Australian-owned 
lenders from these factors appears limited; liaison 
with industry suggests that office projects with 
lower precommitment rates are generally financed 
from developers’ own equity (or that of their 
investment partners). Also, as discussed above, while 
some residential developments that are targeted at 
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As of January each yearyears in Sydney, Brisbane and Perth. Beyond this, 
industry liaison indicates that the current softness 
in tenant demand has led to some projects being 
delayed or cancelled, and building approvals have 
declined over the first half of this year. Supply-side 
pressure in the retail sector should remain limited, 
with the increase in construction activity over the 
past few years largely related to the refurbishment 
and modest expansion of existing centres, and 
construction of ‘large format’ retail centres (occupied 
by a single retailer). 
One risk facing the commercial property sector 
is that a reversal in the strong growth in investor 
demand might expose the market to a sharp 
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foreign investors comprise smaller-sized apartments 
that may be harder to sell in the secondary market, 
many of these are being constructed by foreign 
developers that are funded by equity or foreign 
banks. Still, a downturn in the markets for these 
properties could weigh on prices of nearby property 
and therefore affect banks’ portfolios indirectly.
More broadly, the near-term risks to the domestic 
financial system from the commercial property 
sector appear modest. Although banks’ commercial 
property exposures are increasing, they are a smaller 
share of banks’ total assets than prior to the financial 
crisis. The increase in exposures has been driven by 
the major banks and Asian-owned banks, particularly 
for the retail, office and ‘other’ (including some 
property trusts, healthcare and education) property 
segments (Graph 3.12). 
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write-off or disposal of impaired loans; the recent 
strong investor demand in the commercial property 
market may have facilitated some of those disposals. 
The fall has been broadly based across property 
types, though it has been most pronounced in retail 
and residential property, which had the highest 
peaks in impairment rates.
business Sector
Funding and balance sheet position
Outside of commercial property, businesses’ risk 
appetite generally remains subdued despite the 
low level of interest rates. In line with subdued 
non-mining investment, growth in intermediated 
business credit remains modest, though it has picked 
up over the past six months (Graph  3.14). Market-
sourced funding also remains subdued (Graph 3.15). 
Net issuance of corporate bonds has been negative 
so far this year, while equity raisings have picked up a 
touch in recent quarters, due to an increase in initial 
public offerings.
Corporate balance sheets appear to generally be 
in good shape following the sustained period of 
deleveraging after the financial crisis. The aggregate 
gearing ratio of listed corporations is near historical 
lows and, importantly, gearing ratios in the more 
While a deterioration in future loan performance of 
commercial property cannot be ruled out, banks 
have been successful in recent years in reducing 
their non-performing commercial property loans. 
The impairment rate on banks’ commercial property 
loans continued to decline over the past six months, 
and is now at its lowest level since 2007 (Graph 3.13). 
Part of the improvement in loan performance over 
recent years was likely to have been due to the 
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vulnerable upper tail of the distribution have 
fallen significantly from their peak in June  2009 
(Graph  3.16). The aggregate interest coverage ratio 
of listed corporations remains fairly high, with 
companies’ profits able to cover their net interest 
expenses around 10 times (Graph 3.17). Despite this, 
the share of listed corporations with a reasonably low 
coverage ratio (assessed here as 3½ or less) exceeds 
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its pre-crisis average. At current levels of profitability, 
these companies could face some difficulty servicing 
their debts in a higher interest rate environment. 
Any risk to the Australian financial system is likely to 
be modest given the share of listed corporate debt 
owed by these companies has halved from its 2008 
peak, to be currently around 20 per cent. 
Loan performance and other indicators  
of business stress
Indicators of business stress have continued to 
improve over the past six months (Graph 3.18). Failure 
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As discussed in the chapter ‘The Australian Financial 
System’, the share of banks’ business loans that 
is non-performing continues to fall. Data for the 
major banks suggest the improvement in loan 
performance over recent years has been broadly 
based across industries, but has been especially 
marked in the property and business services 
(mostly commercial property), and manufacturing 
industries (Graph  3.19). The agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and mining category also contributed to the 
previous increase in non-performing loans, although 
less than half of the deterioration has currently been 
reversed. 
One potential risk to future loan performance is 
that banks might compete for the limited demand 
from businesses for intermediated credit by easing 
lending standards. As discussed in the chapter 
‘The Australian Financial System’, while pricing 
competition between banks in extending loans to 
large corporations has intensified, so far there has 
not been a broad relaxation in non-price terms for 
corporate loans.  R
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rates for both incorporated and unincorporated 
businesses are well below their recent peaks in 2012. 
Among incorporated businesses the decline in the 
failure rate has been led by a fall in the number of 
failures in the services and construction industries. 
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Box C
Households’ Investment Property Exposures: 
Evidence from Tax and Survey Data
The characteristics and risk profile of households’ 
investment property exposures warrant close 
examination given the recent strength of investor 
demand for housing. Investor housing loan approvals 
currently account for almost 40 per cent of the value 
of total housing loan approvals, similar to their share 
in the early 2000s, a period of rapid housing price 
inflation and strong investor demand (Graph  C1). 
As a result, lending to households for property 
investment currently accounts for around 20 per cent 
of banks’ total lending. This box reviews households’ 
investment property exposures and resulting risk 
factors, using data from the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) up to 2011/12 and the 2010 Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey – the latest data available from both sources. 
Investor housing lending typically has attributes that 
differ from those of owner-occupier loans and that 
affect its risk profile.
 • Because interest expenses on investment 
property are tax-deductible, investors have 
stronger incentives than owner-occupiers to 
take out interest-only loans. In Australia, around 
64  per cent of loan approvals to investors are 
interest-only loans compared with 31 per cent to 
owner-occupiers. The typical interest-only period 
on these loans is around five years, though up 
to 15-year periods are also available. During this 
period, the loan principal is usually not being 
paid down, although liaison with banks suggests 
that some borrowers with these loans do make 
discretionary repayments. If the loan balance is 
not declining via principal repayment, it is more 
likely that it will exceed the property value (be 
in negative equity) if housing prices should fall. 
There is also a risk that the borrower could face 
difficulty servicing the higher (principal and 
interest) repayments after the interest-only period 
ends. To reduce this risk, banks assess borrowers’ 
ability to service the higher repayments.
 • Investor loans tend to have lower loan-to-
valuation ratios (LVRs) at origination compared 
with owner-occupier loans. Part of this is likely to 
be driven by investors seeking to avoid the cost 
of lenders mortgage insurance, which is typically 
required for loans with an LVR greater than 
80  per cent. Some institutions also have lower 
maximum LVRs for investor loans, partly to offset 
the risks from lower repayments noted above.  
According to ATO data, the share of the population 
aged 15 years and over with an investment property 
grew steadily through the 1990s and early 2000s, 
before stabilising in the late 2000s at around 10 per 
cent (Graph  C2).1 Over the same period, the share 
1 Property investors are defined as individuals who declare a net rental 
profit or loss on their individual tax return. The data do not distinguish 
between rental receipts/deductions from residential and commercial 
property. Property investments held in self-managed superannuation 
funds are not captured in these data.
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investment both increase with total income 
(Graph  C4).2 While the incidence of investment fell 
between 2003/04 and 2011/12 for people with 
total incomes between $15  000 and $500  000, it 
increased for those with very low incomes and those 
with very high incomes. For investors with very low 
incomes (below $15 000), individuals aged 60 years 
or older comprised a larger share in 2011/12 than in 
2003/04, as an increasing number of baby boomers 
owning investment properties entered retirement.3 
These investors may be more capable of servicing 
any investment property debt than their younger 
low-income counterparts. In particular, even though 
their total income (for tax purposes) is low, they 
are likely to have non-taxable sources of income 
(such as pension streams and drawdowns from 
superannuation funds) to draw on. 
2 Total gross (before-tax assessable) income includes wages and 
salaries, net rental income, net capital gains, income derived from 
financial assets and certain other income items. It excludes non-
taxable sources of income such as pension streams and drawdowns 
from superannuation funds. The average total income per taxpayer 
was around $55 000 in 2011/12, excluding these non-taxable sources.
3 The increase in lower-income individuals aged 60 years and over 
was also partly driven by changes to taxation of superannuation in 
July 2007. Total income as recorded on the individual’s tax return fell 
for those aged 60 years and over after the changes, because some 
superannuation benefits that had previously been taxed became tax-
free and are therefore no longer recorded in total income.  
of these investments that were geared – where the 
investor claimed interest deductions – increased 
steadily before levelling off at a little over 80 per cent. 
Given the sharp increase in investor loan approvals 
over 2013 and 2014 to date, especially in New South 
Wales and Victoria, the share of investors is likely to 
have increased further of late. 
While aggregate measures of property investment 
and gearing increased only modestly from the 
early 2000s to 2011/12, there were some notable 
changes in the distribution of investment and 
gearing across age groups. In particular, the share 
of property investors aged 60 years and over 
increased significantly, to account for around one-
fifth of investors in 2011/12 (Graph  C3). This shift in 
the distribution of investors towards older individuals 
reflects both the ageing of the population as well 
as an increase in the extent of investment property 
ownership within this age group. Individuals in this 
group also became more likely to have a mortgage 
against their property investment, with around half 
of these investors claiming interest deductions from 
their total incomes, though borrowing remained far 
more prevalent among younger investors, with almost 
all investors below the age of 40 years being geared.
ATO data also show that the incidence of property 
investment and the incidence of geared property 
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Graph C4
The HILDA survey provides further insight into 
the finances and total debt outstanding of geared 
property investors. After-tax (disposable) income 
can also be calculated, which is arguably a better 
measure than total gross income (as in the ATO 
data) for assessing the ability of borrowers to service 
their debt. Based on these data, investor households 
with incomes in the top 20 per cent of the income 
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Table C1: Investor Housing Leverage and Debt Serviceability
Households with investor housing debt, by disposable income quintile, 2010
Income 
quintile
Share of 
investor 
housing debt(a)
Share of 
total housing 
debt(b)
Median total housing 
debt repayments to 
disposable income 
ratio
Ahead of schedule 
on owner-occupied 
housing debt 
repayments
Per cent Per cent Per cent
Per cent of households 
in each income quintile
1 (lowest) 2 1 127 19
2 7 2 49 17
3 12 5 42 49
4 20 10 33 47
5 (highest) 60 28 28 54
(a) Sum does not total 100 due to rounding
(b) Total housing debt includes debt on investment properties and any owner-occupier housing debt
Source: HILDA Release 12.0
distribution owe the bulk of the investor housing 
debt and over a quarter of total housing debt 
outstanding. These households appear fairly well 
placed to service their debt: the highest income 
earners are typically using less than 30  per cent of 
their income to service their total property debt, and 
more than half are ahead of schedule on their owner-
occupier mortgage repayments (Table C1).4
At the other end of the income distribution, the HILDA 
survey suggests that households in the bottom 
20  per cent account for just 2  per cent of investor 
housing debt. However, these investors typically have 
a much higher debt-servicing burden compared with 
their higher-income counterparts. Consistent with 
the tax data, the HILDA survey finds that one-quarter 
of these geared low-income property investors are 
retirees. HILDA data suggest that although the debt-
servicing burden of retired low-income investor 
households is high, these investors typically have 
built up more liquid assets to draw on should they fall 
into difficulty servicing their property debt, than their 
younger low-income counterparts.  R
4 Debt servicing in the HILDA survey is measured as ‘usual repayments’. 
For an amortising loan it is likely to capture scheduled principal and 
interest repayments as well as any regular excess repayments made 
by the borrowers.
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The G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have 
continued to work in recent months on key aspects 
of the four core financial regulation reform areas: 
building resilient financial institutions; addressing 
‘too big to fail’; responding to shadow banking risks; 
and making derivatives markets safer. Substantial 
progress has been made in advancing reforms across 
these four areas ahead of the G20 Leaders’ Summit 
in Brisbane in November. Challenging areas remain, 
however, particularly on aspects of ‘too big to fail’ 
and derivatives markets reform. With Australia as 
G20 Chair for 2014, the Reserve Bank, along with the 
Australian Treasury, has been contributing to these 
efforts in recent G20 and FSB meetings, including 
the meetings held in Cairns in September. Progress 
has also been made in other reform areas, including 
financial benchmarks.
Domestically, the Financial System Inquiry released 
its Interim Report in July. The Interim Report raised a 
range of policy issues across many aspects of the 
financial system and regulation, though overall it 
gave a positive assessment of the current financial 
regulatory framework. Following on from its initial 
comprehensive submission, the Bank made a 
second submission to the Inquiry, covering areas 
related to financial stability and the responsibilities 
of the Bank, particularly for the payments system. 
Agencies on the Council of Financial Regulators 
(CFR) continued to progress domestic reforms. 
These include proposed new standards by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
on the supervision of financial conglomerates, 
and a government consultation paper, released 
by the Treasury, on central clearing of interest rate 
derivatives denominated in Australian dollars.
International Regulatory 
Developments and Australia
building resilient financial institutions
As discussed in previous Reviews, much of the policy 
development work in this reform area (namely 
the Basel  III capital and liquidity reforms) has been 
completed, and banks globally and in Australia 
continue to move towards meeting the new 
requirements. Nonetheless, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is working on several 
outstanding elements of its reforms in this area and 
will, by the Leaders’ Summit in November: 
 • finalise the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), 
following a consultation earlier in the year. The 
NSFR is a long-term liquidity requirement which 
aims to make banks’ funding structures more 
resilient.
 • set out its plan to address excessive variability in 
banks’ risk-weighted asset (RWA) calculations, to 
improve consistency and comparability in bank 
capital ratios. The BCBS has been considering 
measures such as improved disclosure and 
narrowing the modelling choices available for 
banks to calculate RWAs.
In addition to Basel III and related work, the BCBS 
has over the past six months proposed or finalised 
measures to enhance aspects of the broader 
Basel framework for bank supervision and risk 
management.
 • In April, the BCBS published its finalised 
framework for measuring and controlling banks’ 
large exposures to a single counterparty. Taking 
effect from 2019, this framework limits a bank’s 
4.  Developments in the Financial  
System Architecture
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total exposures to a single counterparty to 
25 per cent of that bank’s Tier 1 capital. A tighter 
limit of 15  per cent of Tier  1 capital applies 
to exposures between global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs), to reduce the risk of 
contagion between them.
 • In June, the BCBS released its guidelines for 
dealing with weak banks as well as updated 
principles for effective supervisory colleges. 
It also released proposals to change Basel 
Pillar 3 disclosure requirements.  
 – The guidelines for dealing with weak 
banks emphasise the need for: an effective 
supervisory framework; supervisors who 
can detect problems early and act quickly; 
detailed preparation, including resolution 
techniques and public disclosure strategies 
that minimise contagion; and close 
collaboration with supervisors in other 
jurisdictions. The consultation ended in 
mid September.
 – Supervisory colleges are international 
groupings of supervisors of the parent 
company and key branches or subsidiaries 
of global banking groups such as G-SIBs. The 
key changes to the principles include greater 
emphasis on: collaboration and information-
sharing among college members; 
consistent feedback from the home and 
host supervisors to the institution; and the 
relationship between a G-SIB’s college and 
its crisis management group.
 – Pillar  3 measures aim to enhance market 
discipline on banks, to complement Basel 
minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and 
the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). The 
proposed revisions to the Pillar 3 disclosure 
regime aim to enhance comparability across 
banks, with a particular focus on ensuring 
transparency of the internal models used 
by banks to calculate minimum capital 
requirements. The consultation ends in 
October.
In September, APRA outlined its proposed 
implementation of BCBS disclosure requirements 
in several areas. The proposals are based on the 
relevant Basel framework but with modifications for 
Australian circumstances.
 • In line with the BCBS’ timetable, it is proposed 
that a disclosure requirement for the Basel III 
leverage ratio commences from January 2015 
for the five Australian banks using the internal 
ratings-based approach to credit risk. These 
banks are already reporting their leverage ratios 
to APRA as part of the BCBS’ monitoring process.
 • It is proposed that authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs) subject to the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) meet LCR disclosure 
requirements from January 2015, when the LCR 
becomes effective in Australia. The LCR, which is 
the BCBS’ short-term liquidity requirement, will 
apply to the larger, more complex ADIs. 
 • From January 2015, it is proposed that the 
four major Australian banks must disclose 
12 indicators used in the annual G-SIB assessment 
exercise conducted by the BCBS. While not 
currently identified as G-SIBs, these four banks 
have been providing data to the BCBS as part of 
its annual G-SIB assessment exercise, and meet 
the size threshold for disclosing data under the 
G-SIB framework. 
APRA also proposed minor amendments to the ADI 
capital adequacy and public disclosure prudential 
standards, to remedy minor deviations from the 
Basel framework that were identified during the 
BCBS’ recent review of Australia’s compliance with 
the Basel capital framework.
Systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs)
A continuing high priority for the FSB has been 
to address the ‘too big to fail’ issue posed by SIFIs. 
Among several ongoing elements of this work, 
attention has recently focused on developing 
two aspects: the proposal for total loss-absorbing 
capacity (TLAC), a variant of which was discussed 
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in the previous Review, and a framework for 
cross-border recognition of resolution actions. TLAC 
initiatives aim to ensure that G-SIBs have enough 
loss-absorbing capacity in a stress event, so they 
can be resolved in an orderly way that minimises the 
effect on financial stability and avoids using taxpayer 
funds for recapitalisation. It is envisaged that TLAC 
requirements could in part be met through issuance 
of loss-absorbing debt instruments. Private creditors 
holding this debt would be ‘bailed in’ (i.e. their debt 
claim written down or converted into equity) when 
a G-SIB approaches resolution.
The FSB is leading the work on finalising the 
TLAC proposal for presentation to the G20 Leaders’ 
Summit in November. A consultation document is 
planned to be released in time for the Summit, and 
the proposal will be subject to a quantitative impact 
assessment before any final measure is agreed. TLAC 
requirements are intended to apply to G-SIBs only, 
so they will not directly apply to Australian banks. 
However, as G20 Chair, the Australian authorities 
are working with the FSB towards finalising a 
proposal which takes into account differing financial 
system characteristics and legal frameworks, and 
emphasises financial stability objectives. The TLAC 
proposal was one of several international regulatory 
developments discussed at recent CFR meetings.
Establishing a framework for the orderly resolution of 
large, often complex, banks with sizeable operations 
in multiple jurisdictions is another priority of the 
G20 and the FSB. The FSB will soon release a draft 
consultative report with recommendations for 
contractual and statutory approaches to ensure 
cross-border recognition of resolution actions, 
including bail-in of debt issued under foreign law, as 
well as temporary stays on early termination rights 
when a firm enters resolution. As part of this, the 
financial industry is developing a draft protocol that 
would support the enforceability of temporary stays. 
At its recent meeting in Cairns, the FSB discussed 
the need for regulatory measures to promote broad 
adoption of the protocol.
Work has also continued internationally on other 
elements of the SIFI framework.
 • Strengthening resolution regimes continues to 
be a key component of the policies to address 
‘too big to fail’, with jurisdictions encouraged by 
the FSB to implement its Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Key 
Attributes). While implementation has focused 
mainly on banks, the Key Attributes also applies 
to other types of financial entities that could 
be systemically significant or critical if they fail. 
To provide further guidance for authorities 
implementing specific elements of the Key 
Attributes, especially in relation to non-bank 
financial institutions, the FSB will publish in 
mid October annexes to the Key Attributes on 
insurance firms, financial market infrastructures, 
treatment of client assets, and information 
sharing. In addition, consultation papers will 
be published on cooperation and information 
sharing between G-SIB home and host 
authorities, and on the identification of critical 
functions in global systemically important 
insurers (G-SIIs).
 • In April, the FSB released a progress report on 
enhanced supervision, which describes the 
changes in supervisory practices since the 
financial crisis and identifies areas where more 
work is needed. It also released a framework for 
assessing risk culture, which takes into account 
feedback received on an earlier consultative 
document. These two reports are part of the 
FSB’s ongoing efforts to reduce the risks posed 
by SIFIs through more intense and effective 
supervision. Consistent with this, the FSB also 
recently commenced a ‘thematic’ peer review, 
in consultation with the BCBS, on supervisory 
frameworks and approaches applying to SIFIs.
 • In July, following industry feedback on earlier 
proposals and an initial impact assessment, 
the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors released amended proposals for 
the design and calibration of a ‘basic capital 
requirement’ (BCR) for G-SIIs. A final proposal is 
due to be issued ahead of the November Summit, 
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with confidential reporting to supervisors to 
commence in 2015. The BCR will act as the 
foundation for the higher loss-absorbency 
requirement that will apply to G-SIIs, which is to 
be developed in 2015, based on 10  high-level 
principles released in September.
 • The FSB and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) are continuing 
their work on developing methodologies for 
identifying non-bank non-insurer global SIFIs. 
Following industry feedback from a consultation 
earlier in the year, a second consultation 
document is planned for release around the end 
of the year. 
Domestically, the CFR continues to work on 
examining Australia’s resolution and crisis management 
arrangements. At its March 2014 meeting, the CFR 
adopted a formal crisis management training 
framework, which incorporates regular training 
exercises and testing of the CFR agencies’ ability to 
respond and coordinate actions in a crisis situation. 
The first exercise under the new framework was 
a workshop in July to review and familiarise CFR 
agency staff with the detailed arrangements 
developed for responding to distress in a locally 
incorporated ADI. Crisis management arrangements 
encompassing the New Zealand operations of 
Australian banks are an ongoing focus of the work 
under the Trans-Tasman Banking Council, which met 
in July.
Shadow banking
The FSB and other standard-setting bodies continue 
to work on addressing the risks posed by shadow 
banking entities and activities such as money market 
funds (MMFs), finance companies and securities 
lending. As noted in the previous Review, many of 
the recommendations to reform the oversight and 
regulation of shadow banking have already been 
released by the FSB, the BCBS and IOSCO, with the 
focus now on implementation. Steps have been 
taken recently to monitor implementation, including 
through several peer reviews.
 • The FSB has conducted an information-sharing 
exercise as part of its high-level framework for 
shadow banking entities released in 2013. The 
results of this process will inform an FSB peer 
review of implementation in 2015. The Bank 
provided information on Australia’s relatively 
small shadow banking sector. (For a discussion 
of developments in Australia’s shadow banking 
sector, see the chapter ‘The Australian Financial 
System’.)
 • IOSCO recently launched a peer review on the 
implementation of its 2012 recommendations 
relating to MMFs. Separately, in the United 
States, which has the largest MMF market, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission agreed 
in July to implement significant MMF reforms, 
in particular the requirement of a ‘floating net 
asset value’ structure for institutional prime 
MMFs. These reforms help to address the risks 
to US financial stability potentially arising from 
MMF investor runs. Requirements for enhanced 
diversification, disclosure and stress testing have 
also been strengthened.
 • IOSCO has also initiated a peer review on the 
adoption of its recommendations, also released 
in 2012, for aligning incentives in securitisation, 
including risk retention requirements. The 
problems associated with complex securitisation 
products with misaligned incentives for issuers 
were highlighted internationally during the crisis. 
In a related development, a new BCBS-IOSCO 
taskforce, co-chaired by the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC), is examining 
global securitisation markets, with the aims of 
identifying obstacles to the development of 
sustainable securitisation and helping to develop 
simple and transparent securitisation structures.
 • Domestically, in April, APRA proposed changes 
to its prudential framework for securitisation. 
The proposed framework is based on simple, 
low-risk structures that make it straightforward 
for ADIs to use securitisation as a funding tool 
and for capital relief. This, in turn, should help 
reduce industry complexity and improve ADI risk 
allocation and management. 
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Policy development work on shadow banking is 
continuing in several areas.
 • In September, the FSB progressed elements of its 
framework to reduce risks arising from securities 
financing transactions (such as repurchase 
agreements), a key source of leverage for 
the shadow banking sector. These elements 
comprise: a revised regulatory framework on 
haircuts for non-centrally cleared securities 
financing transactions; and consultative 
proposals to be issued on numerical haircut 
floors that would apply to non-bank to non-bank 
transactions. The FSB is also developing standards 
and processes for global data collection and 
aggregation for securities financing transactions, 
which will be released for consultation before 
the Leaders’ Summit.
  Related to this, at its September meeting the 
FSB also discussed a work plan to examine 
possible financial stability issues related to 
collateral re-use (so-called re-hypothecation) 
and potential harmonisation of regulatory 
approaches in this area.
 • The BCBS is continuing its work on addressing 
the risks from banks’ interactions with shadow 
banks. The BCBS’ finalised framework for large 
exposures, discussed above, also applies to 
counterparties that are shadow banks. 
The G20 and the FSB remain engaged on the 
potential for risk to flow to shadow banking, given 
the tightening of bank regulation. In this respect, 
the FSB’s annual Global Shadow Banking Monitoring 
Report (next due for release in November) assists in 
monitoring developments, as do review processes 
in individual jurisdictions such as Australia, where 
the Bank provides an annual update on Australia’s 
shadow banking sector to the CFR. Review and 
monitoring efforts are also occurring on a regional 
basis, with FSB Regional Consultative Groups for 
Asia and the Americas releasing reports in August 
on shadow banking in their regions. The Bank, along 
with the Treasury, contributed to the report for Asia.
Over-the-counter (OtC) derivatives 
markets and financial market 
infrastructures
In April, the FSB released its latest progress report 
on the implementation of OTC derivatives market 
reforms agreed by the G20. The FSB noted that there 
had been continued progress in implementing 
these reforms. Most jurisdictions have made 
necessary changes to legislative frameworks and 
are developing or bringing into force detailed 
rules where required. Market participants’ use of 
centralised infrastructure continues to increase, and 
jurisdictions (including, since April, the European 
Union) have further encouraged this by proposing 
or implementing central clearing requirements. 
Within this overall picture of progress, results are 
still uneven across particular reforms. Broadly, there 
are clear signs of progress in the implementation 
of trade reporting, capital requirements and central 
clearing. However, implementation of reforms to 
promote trading on exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms is taking longer.
More generally, the cross-border issues arising 
from these reforms continue to require attention. 
As discussed in the previous Review, a G20 goal is 
to allow OTC derivatives market regulators to defer 
to each other when it is justified by the quality 
of their regulatory and enforcement regimes. 
While some progress has been made in this area, 
further work on equivalence and substituted 
compliance assessments is needed. To encourage 
progress, in September the FSB published a report 
on jurisdictions’ current processes for deferring 
in this way. As well as publicising cases where 
further progress could be made, this report helps 
jurisdictions understand what their counterparts 
require to assess a regime as equivalent. Also in 
September, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group, 
which brings together relevant regulators from 
several jurisdictions, including Australia, issued 
a further report on addressing cross-border 
implementation issues. For the Leaders’ Summit, the 
group will also report on how it intends to resolve 
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remaining issues together with a timetable for 
implementing the solutions. 
In Australia, authorities continue to implement 
OTC derivatives market reforms, with necessary 
consultation between agencies often conducted 
through the CFR.
 • In their third report on the Australian OTC 
derivatives market, published in April 2014, 
the regulators (APRA, ASIC and the Bank) 
recommended introducing mandatory clearing 
requirements for Australian dollar-denominated 
interest rate derivatives between internationally 
active dealers. This recommendation in part 
reflects that the Australian dollar interest 
rate derivatives market is the largest and 
most systemically important component of 
the OTC derivatives market in Australia and 
that it could also be subject to mandatory 
clearing requirements in other jurisdictions 
in the future. The government has since 
consulted on proposals consistent with these 
recommendations. This consultation builds on 
earlier proposals by the government, based on 
regulators’ recommendations in 2013, to impose 
a similar mandatory clearing requirement 
on interest rate derivatives denominated in 
US  dollars, euro, British pounds and Japanese 
yen. As discussed in the chapter ‘The Australian 
Financial System’, even without a mandatory 
clearing requirement in Australia, most new 
interdealer interest rate derivatives trades are 
already being centrally cleared. This reflects that 
pricing and liquidity are more favourable where 
trades are centrally cleared, in part because 
mandates are already in place in some other 
jurisdictions.
 • Another focus of the April 2014 report was 
whether a mandatory clearing requirement 
should be extended to smaller (‘non-dealer’) 
participants in the Australian OTC derivatives 
market. In their report, the regulators noted 
that even though requiring central clearing 
by non-dealers might help reduce systemic 
risk, the benefits may not outweigh the costs. 
Accordingly, they recommended that mandatory 
central clearing of OTC derivatives should not 
be extended to non-dealers at present, but 
committed to keep the matter under review.
 • Requirements to report OTC derivatives 
transactions continue to be phased in. As of April, 
all financial entities with greater than $50 billion 
notional principal of OTC derivatives outstanding 
have been required to report transactions to 
trade repositories. Smaller financial entities will 
start reporting in 2015. In addition, in September 
DTCC Data Repository (Singapore) (DDRS) 
became the first trade repository to be licensed 
to operate in Australia. Under the licensing 
regime, DDRS is overseen by ASIC and subject 
to stringent standards based on the Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs). However, 
ASIC is also placing a high degree of reliance on 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which is 
DDRS’ home supervisor.
Standard-setting bodies have also recently finalised 
elements of international policy work relevant to 
OTC derivatives markets.
 • In April, the BCBS issued a final standard for 
capital requirements for bank exposures to 
central counterparties (CCPs). This framework 
supports broader policy efforts advanced by the 
G20 and the FSB, particularly those noted earlier 
promoting central clearing of standardised OTC 
derivatives contracts. The final standard includes, 
among other requirements, a single approach 
for calculating capital requirements for a bank’s 
exposure arising from its contributions to the 
mutualised default fund of a qualifying CCP and 
an explicit cap on the capital charges applicable 
to those exposures. The standard will take effect 
from 2017 (interim requirements released earlier 
will continue to apply until that time).
 • In September, IOSCO launched a consultation 
on risk mitigation standards for non-centrally 
cleared OTC derivatives. While a key plank of 
G20 reforms has been to encourage central 
clearing of standardised OTC derivatives, a 
substantial proportion of OTC derivatives are not 
standardised and hence not suitable for central 
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clearing. The proposed standards complement 
the BCBS-IOSCO margin requirements framework 
for non-centrally cleared derivatives released in 
September 2013. The proposed standards aim 
to promote legal certainty and facilitate timely 
resolution of disputes between counterparties by, 
among other things, establishing requirements 
around the timely confirmation of trades, as well 
as the process of valuing and reconciling trades 
between two counterparties. The consultation 
closes in mid October.
 • Following an earlier consultation, the FSB 
released a report in September on how 
information from trade repositories could be 
aggregated and shared. Such data can be used 
by authorities to monitor global trends in OTC 
derivatives markets, and in particular the risks 
arising from these markets.
In May 2014, a taskforce established by IOSCO 
and the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems – since renamed the Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures – released a 
report on jurisdictions progress in implementing 
the PFMIs. The PFMIs were issued in 2012 by the 
two standard-setting bodies to update, harmonise 
and strengthen the pre-existing standards for 
financial market infrastructures, particularly in light 
of their increasing use in the context of the reforms 
noted above. The taskforce, on which the Bank is 
represented, was established to help ensure the 
consistent implementation of the PFMIs across 
its member jurisdictions. In its progress report, 
the taskforce assessed further steps taken by 
28 jurisdictions to incorporate the PFMIs within their 
respective regulatory frameworks. It concluded that 
implementation was well advanced for the regulatory 
frameworks for CCPs, trade repositories and payment 
systems. Several jurisdictions (including Australia) 
had completed their implementation measures. 
The taskforce has now commenced a more detailed 
assessment of the implementation of the PFMIs, 
focusing initially on CCPs and trade repositories in 
the three largest jurisdictions (the United States, 
the European Union and Japan). The taskforce aims 
to complete assessments of all three jurisdictions 
ahead of the G20 Summit in November.
Other developments
International bodies continue to work on regulatory 
issues beyond the core areas noted above, both to 
address gaps revealed by the crisis, and as part of 
ongoing efforts to enhance regulatory frameworks 
and arrangements. 
Work has been ongoing to review and reform 
financial benchmarks following concerns about their 
integrity.
 • Through an Official Sector Steering Group 
(OSSG), of which the Bank is a member, the FSB 
has been examining the setting of interbank 
and other financial benchmark rates. The OSSG 
assessed the feasibility and viability of existing 
and alternative benchmark rates, taking into 
consideration input from a related group of 
private sector participants. Based on this work, 
the FSB released a report in July which sets 
out proposals and timelines for the reform and 
strengthening of existing major interest rate 
benchmarks (LIBOR, EURIBOR and TIBOR) and 
for additional work to develop and introduce 
alternative risk-free benchmarks. The Bank also 
co-chairs a group looking at foreign exchange 
benchmarks: the FSB will release a report with 
recommendations by the end of September.
 • As part of the FSB’s work, an IOSCO group 
(co-chaired by ASIC) has been reviewing 
the implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for 
Financial Benchmarks by the administrators of 
the three major interest rate benchmarks. In 
July, IOSCO released its review report which 
found that all three administrators had made 
significant progress in implementing the 
majority of IOSCO’s principles, which cover 
overall oversight, governance, transparency and 
accountability. This has improved the quality and 
integrity of the benchmarks. IOSCO did note, 
however, that further work was needed in the 
areas of benchmark design, data sufficiency and 
transparency of benchmark determinations.
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Over the past six months, efforts have continued 
to reduce the mechanistic reliance on credit rating 
agency (CRA) ratings.
 • In May, the FSB released a peer review of 
members’ progress in implementing the FSB’s 
Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings. 
While some progress has been made, challenges 
remain. In particular, identifying alternative 
standards for assessing creditworthiness has 
proven difficult, as has the removal of ratings from 
international risk-based prudential frameworks 
for banks and insurers. The report recommends 
that national authorities continue to work with 
market participants to strengthen internal credit 
assessment processes and develop alternative 
measures of creditworthiness, so that CRA ratings 
are only one input into credit assessments.
 • In June, IOSCO released for consultation Good 
Practices on Reducing Reliance on CRAs in Asset 
Management. While acknowledging that external 
credit ratings are useful inputs into internal credit 
assessments, the report outlines practices which 
encourage internal credit assessments that 
are not solely based on external credit ratings. 
These practices include: internally assessing 
the credit quality of financial instruments; and 
understanding the methodologies used to 
obtain the external credit rating. Regulators 
could also encourage investment managers to 
disclose how external credit ratings are used in 
internal credit assessments.
In October, the FSB, in collaboration with the 
International Monetary Fund and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, is 
expected to report on the cross-border consistency 
and global financial stability implications of planned 
or implemented domestic structural banking 
reforms such as the ‘ring-fencing’ proposals by 
some jurisdictions. Many of these measures seek to 
address the domestic ‘too big to fail’ problem, but 
can also affect financial institutions and markets in 
other countries.
At its September meeting, the FSB agreed that it 
will prepare from 2015 a consolidated annual report 
to the G20 on the implementation of the reforms 
and their effects. This will help improve accessibility 
and comparability of information and thereby 
promote timely and consistent implementation of 
agreed reforms. The FSB and international standard-
setting bodies will also publish information in 2015 
summarising their processes for policy development 
and implementation reviews. This should enhance 
transparency and improve the public understanding 
of the work of these bodies, and how they go about 
executing their mandates.
In recent months, the FSB has been reviewing 
the structure of its representation, and proposals 
are being developed that, in part, respond to the 
increasingly important role of emerging markets 
in the global economy and the financial system. 
Australian authorities, including the Bank, provided 
input to the review, and the FSB’s proposed approach 
was discussed at both the FSB and G20 meetings in 
September; a report is due to the Leaders’  Summit.
Other Domestic Regulatory 
Developments
Financial System Inquiry
The Interim Report of the Financial System Inquiry 
– the first comprehensive review of the Australian 
financial system in 17 years – was released in mid July. 
A broad range of policy options were put forward, 
with the efficacy of the consumer disclosure regime 
and the superannuation system in focus. The Interim 
Report gave broad support for the existing regulatory 
architecture and it acknowledged the effectiveness 
of existing coordination arrangements under 
the CFR. However, it did highlight some areas for 
improvement, including some potential measures to 
promote increased coordination among regulators. 
In addition, the Interim Report raised the option of 
formalising the role of the CFR within statute, as well 
as expanding its membership and responsibilities. 
Several options were raised to mitigate systemic risk 
and address any perceptions that some entities are 
‘too big to fail’, including strengthening resolution 
and pre-planning arrangements to handle financial 
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distress, and separating or ‘ring-fencing’ certain 
aspects of banks’ businesses.
To complement its comprehensive initial submission 
to the Inquiry, the Bank provided a targeted 
Supplementary Submission, focusing on the issues 
raised in the Interim Report that directly relate to 
financial stability and the responsibilities of the Bank. 
It gave broad support for a number of the themes 
raised in the Interim Report, including the call for 
strong, independent and accountable regulators and 
the consideration of impediments to the provision 
of small business finance. The Supplementary 
Submission also emphasised the following points.
 • Reforms over the past decade or so have been 
effective in improving competition and efficiency 
in payment systems. The Bank’s current approach 
to payment system regulation, as overseen by the 
Payments System Board, remains appropriate. 
However, there may be scope to clarify how 
purchased payment facilities are regulated.
 • The CFR has worked well and cooperatively 
under its existing informal arrangements 
and charter. If there is appetite to formalise 
arrangements and/or increase the responsibility 
of the CFR, care should be taken to ensure that 
the existing powers and independence of each 
member agency are not eroded, and that the 
emphasis on cooperation remains.
 • Any proposed new measures to enhance system 
stability should account for the work already 
underway – globally and domestically – to 
improve the resilience of the financial system. 
This is a challenging area for policy development; 
hence, care should be taken in implementing 
new policies and consideration given to how 
these changes may interact with pre-existing 
policies.
 • Superannuation assets should be managed in 
the best interests of members. Measures to lower 
costs and fees, optimise liquidity management 
and limit leverage should be considered.
 • The supply of mortgage finance in Australia is 
ample. Therefore, any proposed policies that 
could further increase that supply should be 
subject to rigorous analysis of their costs, benefits 
to consumers and risks to financial stability.
The Inquiry will provide a final report to the Treasurer 
by November.
Other developments
Following feedback on earlier proposals, APRA 
released its planned supervisory framework for 
financial conglomerate (‘Level 3’) groups in August. 
This framework draws on the Joint Forum’s revised 
Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates 
released in September 2012, and will provide APRA 
with a better understanding of the risks to which 
APRA-regulated institutions within Level 3 groups 
are exposed, particularly from non-APRA-regulated 
activities. APRA responded to issues raised by industry 
on all four components of the framework: group 
governance, risk exposures, risk management and 
capital adequacy. APRA listed eight conglomerate 
groups which will become subject to the Level 
3 framework when it is implemented. However, 
these groups, which control around 80 per cent of 
the assets of all APRA-regulated institutions, will 
not need additional capital to meet the planned 
new requirements. The framework will be finalised 
by APRA after the government responds to the 
recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry.
As discussed in ‘The Australian Financial System’ 
chapter, APRA recently released for consultation a 
draft Prudential Practice Guide – Residential Mortgage 
Lending. Since residential mortgages make up a 
significant proportion of Australian banks’ credit 
exposures, monitoring housing lending standards 
is an important part of APRA’s supervisory role. In 
its draft document, APRA has provided guidance 
on risk management practices for housing 
lending, including: addressing the risks associated 
with residential mortgage lending in the bank’s 
risk management framework; considering loan 
origination channels and their associated risks; 
ensuring portfolio limits for riskier loans are observed; 
valuing underlying collateral in an appropriate way; 
and undertaking robust stress testing.  R
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Copyright and Disclaimer Notices
HILDA
The following Disclaimer applies to data obtained 
from the HILDA Survey and used in the chapter on 
‘Household and Business Finances’ and reported in 
‘Box C: Households’ Investment Property Exposures: 
Evidence from Tax and Survey Data’ in this issue of 
the Review.
Disclaimer
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey was initiated and is funded 
by the Australian Government Department of Social 
Services (DSS), and is managed by the Melbourne 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research 
(Melbourne Institute). The findings and views based 
on these data should not be attributed to either DSS 
or the Melbourne Institute.
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